Battle of Barfleur

Posted by Cris D on Sunday 19th of July 2026 16:43

According to the law report of Arthur v Bokenham (88 E.R. 957), Court of Common Pleas, Robert Bokenham RN in his Will made 3 May 1692 just before he set sail, described himself as Commander of "Their Late Majesties ship 'The Grafton'". So perhaps his name is the one missing from the Commander column for Red Squadron - Main.

Posted by F.F. on Monday 12th of May 2025 15:56

I inaccurately quoted Clowes. Here are his true words:

William Laird Clowes et alii, The Royal Navy: A History from the Earliest Times to the Present, volume ⅱ, ch ⅹⅹⅲ :
« Tourville and his captains had made a most gallant defence, and had, indeed, done wonders, seeing that, when night fell after the battle of Cape Barfleur on May 19ᵗʰ they had not lost a single ship. Had Barfleur had no morrow, the action would have been a French triumph; for, although much of the allied line was never fully engaged, the French fought from beginning to end against enormously superior forces. The battle presents no very interesting tactical features, but it pointedly illustrates the strategic maxim that the best place in which to attack a naval enemy is close to his own shores. Credit is due to Russell for the promptitude with which, in face of difficulty, he arranged his junction with the Dutch; but it can scarcely be contended that at Barfleur, and during the subsequent movements, he could, with his greatly superior fleet, have well done much less than he did. He won a victory of vast importance, yet of no particular brilliancy. Tourville lost a very small amount of reputation in the encounter, and Russell gained as little.»

For sure Tourville lost very small amount of reputation: that is an understatement; and in fact Barfleur was rarher considered as a nonsuch batlle.

Georges Lacour-Gayet, Les Journées de Barfleur et de La Hougue, 29 mai-3 juin 1692, Paris, 1914 :
« Il ne tint pas rigueur à Pontchartrain, à qui ses ordres impératifs et sa suspicion à l'égard de l'amiral créaient une lourde responsabilité.

À Tourville même, il fit servir une gratification de 20 000 livres et, dix mois plus tard, il lui donnait le bâton de maréchal de France. Le bâton de maréchal ! »

Googletranslate:
«He [Louis XIV] did not hold it against Pontchartrain, whose imperative orders and suspicion of the admiral created a heavy responsibility.

[To] Tourville himself, he [awarded] a gratuity of 20,000 livres [a bit over £1,340 in 1692], and ten months later he gave him the baton of Marshal of France. The baton of Marshal!»


From the French historian Patrick Villiers (Victoire de Barfleur ou défaite de La Hougue : 29 mai-2 juin 1692. Published in Revue du Nord, tome 74, n°294, January-March 1992, page 64; can be read online):
« Apprenant le combat naval du 29 mai, il eut ce mot sincère : “Tourville est-il sauf ? car des vaisseaux perdus se remplacent mais un homme comme lui ne se remplacerait pas…” et le recevant à Versailles, il l'accueillit en disant : “J'ai eu plus de joie à apprendre que 44 de mes vaisseaux ont battu 99 de mes ennemis pendant un jour que [de peine d’apprendre l]es pertes que j'ai faites…”.

Le Roi ajouta ensuite : “Monsieur le comte, je suis très satisfait de vous et de toute la Marine…”.

Googletranslate:
«On learning of the naval combat of the 29ᵗʰ of May, he [Louis XIV] had this sincere word: “Is Tourville safe? for lost ships are replaced, but a man like him would not be replaced…” and receiving him at Versailles, he welcomed him by saying: “I was more happy to learn that 44 of my ships defeated 99 of my enemies for a day than [I was afflicred to learn] of the losses I made…”.

The King then added: “Monsieur le Comte, I am very satisfied with you and with the whole Navy…”.

Posted by F.F. on Monday 21st of April 2025 00:11

Sorry for that new submission: my first attempt resulted in a partially “erased” comment – I don't understand how. My second was rejected for an unexplained reason, and only a “cutted” comment succeeded to go further. New attempt to publish a complete comment.

«He had not received the order to avoid an action; he believed that he was expected to fight»

«he seems to have been at first quite ignorant as to the overwhelming strength of the Allies, and to have supposed that not more than five and forty ships were opposed to him.»

It seems no French source was used. Now it is known that spies made the French Government believe that most of the British captains would not fight, as they were expected to be loyal to James II and not to William III. But from long French sources had published the orders given to Tourville.

Georges Lacour-Gayet, Les Journées de Barfleur et de La Hougue, 29 mai-3 juin 1692, Paris, 1914 :

« Le ministre [de la Marine] avait fait signer par Louis XIV, le 26 mars [1692], les instructions qui concernaient cette campagne. Quelques passages sont à citer ici; on en remarquera le caractère singulièrement impératif :

“Sa Majesté veut absolument que la diligence qu'elle désire se fasse ; elle s'en prendrait au sieur de Tourville, si elle ne se faisait pas.

Sa Majesté veut absolument qu'il parte de Brest, quand même il aurait avis que les ennemis soient dehors avec un nombre de vaisseaux supérieur à ceux qui seront en état de le suivre.

En cas qu'il les rencontre en allant à la Hougue, Sa Majesté veut qu'il les combatte, en quelque nombre qu'ils soient, qu'il les poursuive jusque dans leurs ports, s'il les bat ;. et s'il a du désavantage, Sa Majesté se remet à lui de sauver l'armée le mieux qu'il pourra.”

En post-scriptum il y avait : “J'ajoute ce mot de ma main à cette instruction, pour vous dire que ce qu'elle contient est ma volonté, et que je veux qu'on l'observe exactement. Louis [XIV].”

(…)

Comment Tourville n'avait-il point eu connaissance de cette supériorité écrasante de l'ennemi ? Au dernier moment des corvettes lui avaient été envoyées pour l'en informer ; quand elles le rejoignirent, la bataille était déjà engagée.

Tourville, en effet, n'avait pas eu une minute d'hésitation. Il n'assembla point un conseil de guerre, il ne consulta pas ses officiers généraux ; il fut le vrai chef, le chef qui prend sur lui toutes les responsabilités. Ses instructions lui donnaient l'ordre absolu de combattre les ennemis, en quelque nombre qu'ils fussent ; on avait donné à entendre qu'il manquait de décision et de courage. Il fit sur l'heure même ce que lui commandaient les ordres du Roi et son honneur de soldat.

(…)

L'histoire militaire offre peu d'exemples d'une aussi admirable solidité. 44 vaisseaux, il faut le redire encore, en avaient attaqué 89 et les avaient forcés à leur laisser le champ libre.»

Google translates:

«The Minister [of the Navy] had Louis XIV sign the instructions concerning this campaign on March 26 [1692]. A few passages are worth quoting here; their singularly imperative nature will be noted:

“His Majesty absolutely [wants] that the speed he desires be carried out; he would [blame[ Mr. de Tourville if it were not.

His Majesty absolutely desires that he leave Brest, even if he were informed that the enemy is outside with a number of ships greater than those capable of following him.

In the event that he encounters them on his way to La Hougue, His Majesty desires that he fight them, whatever their number, and pursue them to their ports, if he defeats them; and if he is at a disadvantage, His Majesty leaves it up to him to save the army as best he can.”

In the postscript, it read: “I add this note in my own handwriting to this instruction to tell you that what it contains is my will, and that I want it to be strictly observed. Louis [XIV].”

(…)

How could Tourville have been unaware of this overwhelming enemy superiority? At the last moment, corvettes had been sent to inform him; when they reached him, the battle was already underway.

Tourville, in fact, had not hesitated for a moment. He did not convene a council of war, he did not consult his general officers; he was the true leader, the leader who took all responsibility upon himself. His instructions gave him absolute orders to fight the enemy, whatever their numbers; it had been implied that he lacked decision and courage. He did immediately what the King's orders and his honor as a soldier commanded him to do.

(…)

Military history offers few examples of such admirable fortitude. 44 ships, it must be said again, had attacked 89 and forced them to give way.»

William Laird Clowes, The Royal Navy (available on Internet Archive):
«If there had been no sequel to Barfleur, it would have been a French triumph.»

Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783 (available on The Project Gutenberg or on Internet Archive):
«No higher proof of military spirit and efficiency could be given by any navy, and Tourville's seamanship and tactical ability contributed largely to the result, which it must also be confessed was not creditable to the allies.»

Posted by F.F. on Monday 21st of April 2025 00:00

Georges Lacour-Gayet, Les Journées de Barfleur et de La Hougue, 29 mai-3 juin 1692, Paris, 1914 :

« Le ministre [de la Marine] avait fait signer par Louis XIV, le 26 mars [1692], les instructions qui concernaient cette campagne. Quelques passages sont à citer ici; on en remarquera le caractère singulièrement impératif :

“Sa Majesté veut absolument que la diligence qu'elle désire se fasse ; elle s'en prendrait au sieur de Tourville, si elle ne se faisait pas.

Sa Majesté veut absolument qu'il parte de Brest, quand même il aurait avis que les ennemis soient dehors avec un nombre de vaisseaux supérieur à ceux qui seront en état de le suivre.

En cas qu'il les rencontre en allant à la Hougue, Sa Majesté veut qu'il les combatte, en quelque nombre qu'ils soient, qu'il les poursuive jusque dans leurs ports, s'il les bat ;. et s'il a du désavantage, Sa Majesté se remet à lui de sauver l'armée le mieux qu'il pourra.”

En post-scriptum il y avait : “J'ajoute ce mot de ma main à cette instruction, pour vous dire que ce qu'elle contient est ma volonté, et que je veux qu'on l'observe exactement. Louis [XIV].”

(…)

Comment Tourville n'avait-il point eu connaissance de cette supériorité écrasante de l'ennemi ? Au dernier moment des corvettes lui avaient été envoyées pour l'en informer ; quand elles le rejoignirent, la bataille était déjà engagée.

Tourville, en effet, n'avait pas eu une minute d'hésitation. Il n'assembla point un conseil de guerre, il ne consulta pas ses officiers généraux ; il fut le vrai chef, le chef qui prend sur lui toutes les responsabilités. Ses instructions lui donnaient l'ordre absolu de combattre les ennemis, en quelque nombre qu'ils fussent ; on avait donné à entendre qu'il manquait de décision et de courage. Il fit sur l'heure même ce que lui commandaient les ordres du Roi et son honneur de soldat.

(…)

L'histoire militaire offre peu d'exemples d'une aussi admirable solidité. 44 vaisseaux, il faut le redire encore, en avaient attaqué 89 et les avaient forcés à leur laisser le champ libre.»

Google translates:

«The Minister [of the Navy] had Louis XIV sign the instructions concerning this campaign on March 26 [1692]. A few passages are worth quoting here; their singularly imperative nature will be noted:

“His Majesty absolutely [wants] that the speed he desires be carried out; he would [blame[ Mr. de Tourville if it were not.

His Majesty absolutely desires that he leave Brest, even if he were informed that the enemy is outside with a number of ships greater than those capable of following him.

In the event that he encounters them on his way to La Hougue, His Majesty desires that he fight them, whatever their number, and pursue them to their ports, if he defeats them; and if he is at a disadvantage, His Majesty leaves it up to him to save the army as best he can.”

In the postscript, it read: “I add this note in my own handwriting to this instruction to tell you that what it contains is my will, and that I want it to be strictly observed. Louis [XIV].”

(…)

How could Tourville have been unaware of this overwhelming enemy superiority? At the last moment, corvettes had been sent to inform him; when they reached him, the battle was already underway.

Tourville, in fact, had not hesitated for a moment. He did not convene a council of war, he did not consult his general officers; he was the true leader, the leader who took all responsibility upon himself. His instructions gave him absolute orders to fight the enemy, whatever their numbers; it had been implied that he lacked decision and courage. He did immediately what the King's orders and his honor as a soldier commanded him to do.

(…)

Military history offers few examples of such admirable fortitude. 44 ships, it must be said again, had attacked 89 and forced them to give way.»

Posted by F.F. on Sunday 20th of April 2025 23:34

«He had not received the order to avoid an action; he believed that he was expected to fight»

«he seems to have been at first quite ignorant as to the overwhelming strength of the Allies, and to have supposed that not more than five and forty ships were opposed to him.»

It seems no French source was used. Now it is known that spies made France believe that most of the British captains would not fight, as they were expected to be loyal to James II and not to William III. But from long French sources had published the orders given to Tourville.


Comment Tourville n'avait-il point eu connaissance de cette supériorité écrasante de l'ennemi ? Au dernier moment des corvettes lui avaient été envoyées pour l'en informer ; quand elles le rejoignirent, la bataille était déjà engagée.

Tourville, en effet, n'avait pas eu une minute d'hésitation. Il n'assembla point un conseil de guerre, il ne consulta pas ses officiers généraux ; il fut le vrai chef, le chef qui prend sur lui toutes les responsabilités. Ses instructions lui donnaient l'ordre absolu de combattre les ennemis, en quelque nombre qu'ils fussent ; on avait donné à entendre qu'il manquait de décision et de courage. Il fit sur l'heure même ce que lui commandaient les ordres du Roi et son honneur de soldat.

(…)

L'histoire militaire offre peu d'exemples d'une aussi admirable solidité. 44 vaisseaux, il faut le redire encore, en avaient attaqué 89 et les avaient forcés à leur laisser le champ libre.»

William Laird Clowes, The Royal Navy (available on Internet Archive):
«If there had been no sequel to Barfleur, it would have been a French triumoh.»

Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783 (available on The Project Gutenberg or on Internet Archive):
«No higher proof of military spirit and efficiency could be given by any navy, and Tourville's seamanship and tactical ability contributed largely to the result, which it must also be confessed was not creditable to the allies.»

Posted by regis on Monday 30th of May 2016 11:16

Brillant captain chevalier de Combes

Foudroyand captain de Relingue perdu le 2 juin

44 ships of line and 11 fireships

source
"mes campagnes en mer sous loius 14" de Philippe de Villette-Mursay colection In-Texte Tallandier