Alliance

Posted by Terry Shiflett on Wednesday 14th of January 2015 16:37

Continental Frigate Alliance

An agreement between two countries to support one another in case of war. In 1778, during the American Revolutionary War, the United States signed an alliance with France.
Other Names: None
L/B/D: l. 151'; b. 36'; dph. 12' 6"; s. 13 kts.
Tons: 900
Comp.: 300
Arm.: 28 12-pdrs 8 6-pdrs (designed) 28 12-pdrs 8 9-pdrs (operational)
Des.: Designer:/builder: William and James K. Hackett, Salisbury, Mass
Authorized: 20 November 1776
Laid down: 1777
Launched: 28 April 1778
Commissioned: 29 May 1778
Disposition: Sold 1 August 1785 to John Coburn, converted to an East Indiaman. When she was no longer seaworthy, she was abandoned off Petty Island across the Delaware River from Philadelphia. Her hulk was destroyed during dredging operations in 1901.

Detail of a Contemporary painting by Captain Matthew Parke, USMC, depicting Alliance passing Boston Lighthouse from sea, 1781

The Continental Congress authorized Alliance, which would be the only active Continental Frigate remaining in American hands at the end of American Revolutionary War on 20 November 1776. Constructed by William and James K. Hackett at Salisbury, Massachusetts, and launched 28 April 1777, after the usual delays, the result of the chronic lack of money & material that would plague the fledgling American Navy during the war. Moved to Boston Harbor about the middle of December, she fitted out for her first voyage.

Pierre Landais, formerly of the French Navy, and an experienced naval officer, having sailed around the world with the famous navigator Bougainville, became Alliance’s first commanding officer. He had embarked in the American cause and on the recommendation of Silas Deane. Highly regarded, he was appointed a captain in the Continental Navy, and Massachusetts made him an honorary citizen.
The frigates Deane, Captain Nicholson, and Alliance sailed together from Boston January 14 1779. The Alliance was bound for France, transporting Lafayette back to France to petition the French Court for increased support in the American struggle for independence. She parted with her consort on the third day out.
She arrived at Brest February 6, 1779, after a passage of twenty-three days from Boston. The voyage had not been without incident. She capturing two vessels, lost her main topmast in a storm, and on 2 February, a mutiny was discovered among the English and Irish sailors on board. The difficulty of recruiting ships' crews for the regular naval service, chiefly due to the superior attractions of privateering, had led to the practice in some cases of enlisting British prisoners, who were willing in this manner to escape confinement. In the case of the Alliance, the disinclination of Americans to sail under a French captain had increased the difficulty and accordingly many of the crew claimed to be British subjects. The unreliable character of such crews can be illustrated in this instance. Among the ringleaders of the conspiracy was one John Savage, master-at-arms, and William Murray, sergeant of marines. Murray confessed, saying, "that Savage and he, with 70 more, had agreed to take the ship and carry her into some part of England or Ireland, and force one of the Lieutenants to take command of her. He said the plan they had laid to take her was, that they were to divide themselves into four divisions, the first to take the magazine, the other three at the same time to force the cabbin, wardroom, and quarter deck, then to take command of the arm-chests, and in case of opposition, they were to point the fore-castle guns aft and fire them, the guns being 9 pounders and all loaded. The party that was to go to the magazine were to kill the Gunner, Carpenter and Boat-swain; the other punishments for the other officers and French gentlemen were thus: Captain Landais was to be put in irons and sent in the cutter, without victuals or drink; the Lieutenants were to walk overboard on a plank from the ship side, unless they would take charge of her and navigate the ship into England; the marine officers and the Doctor were to be hanged, quartered, and hove overboard; the sailing Master was to be tied up to the mizzen-mast, scarrified all over, cut to pieces, and hove overboard." Lafayette was to be put in irons and sent to England. Thirty-eight of the mutineers would be put ashore to await trial.

After the marquis and his suite had disembarked, Benjamin Franklin, one of the American commissioners in Paris, ordered her to remain in France despite the fact that Landais' original instructions had called for him to load the frigate with munitions and then to sail promptly for America. Instead, Franklin assigned the frigate to a squadron commanded by Capt. John Paul Jones.
The squadron departed Groix Roads, near L'Orient, France on 19 June to escort a convoy of merchantmen to Bordeaux and other French ports. On the night of the 20th the BonHomme Richard and Alliance fouled each other, carrying away the Richard's jib-boom and the Alliance's mizzen-mast. Jones considered Landais responsible for this accident, but Lieutenant Robinson of the Richard received court-martial and dismissal from service.

Trouble on board the Alliance caused Jones annoyance and perplexity, not knowing at first where to place the blame. There was a distinct lack of harmony between the Captain of the frigate and his officers and crew, Landais having a temperament that made impossible anything like efficient cooperation between him and either superiors or inferiors.

The French planned an invasion of southern England that summer, and asked Jones to carry out a diversionary raid in the northern British Isles. His flotilla sortied from Groix Roads on 14 August and headed for the southwestern corner of Ireland to begin n a clockwise circumnavigation of the British Isles.
Not many days passed before Landais-who in Jones' opinion had been the real culprit in the collision two months before-began to show his disinclination toward obeying orders. On the 23d, he was enraged when the commodore refused to allow him to chase a ship into shallow and unknown waters ". . . when there was not sufficient wind to govern a ship…" The next day, Jones later reported, Alliance's unruly captain came on board the flagship and addressed the commodore ". . . in the most gross and insulting terms..." From that point on, Landais seemed to ignore orders entirely and operated Alliance according to his own whims.

Thus, the only American warship in Jones' squadron belied her name by refusing to cooperate with the French vessels. She left her consorts during a squall on the night of 26 and 27 August and did not rejoin the squadron until 1 September. Betsy, a letter-of-marque ship she had just taken then accompanied the frigate. About this time, BonHomme Richard captured a similar ship named Union off Cape Wrath at the northwestern corner of Scotland, and Jones allowed Landais to man both vessels. The latter again showed his complete contempt for the commodore by sending the prizes to Bergan, Norway, where the Danish Government, not having recognized the independence of the American Colonies from Great Briton, declared their capture illegal. The Danes turned the ships over to the British consul, depriving their captors of the satisfaction of having hurt the enemy and of any hope of being rewarded for their efforts. (Captain Landis petitioned The United States Government in 1785, and again on 23 December 1807, as well as 5 February 1810 for redress in the matter, however the claims were denied, as the probability of the prizes making it to a port were they could have been legally sold was minimal).
In the next few days, Alliance took two more small ships prompting Jones to signal Landais to board BonHomme Richard for a conference. The American frigate's commander refused to obey, instead, sailing off once again.

For more than two weeks thereafter, Alliance worked her way south independently along the eastern shore of Great Britain while the remainder of the squadron followed a similar course from out of sight. A bit before midnight on 22 September, a lookout in BonHomme Richard reported seeing two ships.
Jones hoisted recognition signals, which were unanswered. Landais was continuing to ignore the flagship's efforts to communicate. Nevertheless, at dawn, Jones was able to recognize Alliance and Pallas, a frigate of his squadron, which had recently parted from the flagship with the Commodore's permission to hunt prizes.

About mid-afternoon on 23 September, the flagship sighted a large number of ships approaching from the north-northeast. The oncoming vessels were part of a convoy of British merchantmen, which had sailed from the Baltic Sea under the escort of the 44-gun frigate HMS Serapis (50) and the 20-gun hired armed sloop Countess of Scarborough. When the English vessels realized that strange warships were bearing down on them, the merchant ships turned shoreward while their two escorts headed toward the American force challenging it to battle.

Jones signaled his ships to form a line of battle, but Landais ignored the order and remained aloof from the action. During most of the ensuing four-hour battle off the chalk cliffs of Flamborough Head on England's Yorkshire coast, Alliance kept her distance from the action, which lasted well into the night. Some two hours after the first guns fired, Alliance entered the fray. When he saw her approach, Jones happily "...But, to his utter astonishment…" Landais' ship ". . . discharged a broadside full into the stern of the BonHomme Richard..." Jones and his crew ". . . called to him [Landais] for God's sake to forbear firing into the BonHomme Richard, yet he passed along off the side of the ship and continued firing..." However, Capt. Richard Pearson, who commanded Serapis, reported that Alliance was also firing into his ship. Thus, it appears that Landais was indiscriminately attacking both combatants.
Ignoring incredible damage to hull and rigging, as well as appalling loss of life, limb, and blood, each side continued to fight with unflagging determination and unshaken valor. Then, when it seemed that neither ship could remain much longer afloat, Serapis finally struck her colors.

Following the surrender, Alliance stood by during a desperate struggle to save the shattered, burning, leaking hulks. On the evening of the day after the battle, Jones realized that, while his flagship was doomed, her conquered opponent would probably survive. He, therefore, transferred his crew from BonHomme Richard to Serapis and, the next morning, sadly watched the former sink.
By 29 September, untiring labor had enabled Serapis to get underway, and the squadron headed for the coast of Holland. Alliance sighted land on the evening of 2 October and, the following morning, she anchored in Texel Roads, Amsterdam's deep-water harbor, with the rest of the squadron.

When word of the battle reached London, the Admiralty ordered its nearby men-of-war to search for Jones' flotilla, but the Royal Navy proceeded to look in all of the wrong places. By the time a merchantman informed London that Jones was at Texel Roads, the victorious Allies and their prizes had been safe at anchor there for a week. The Royal Navy then set up a tight blockade off the Dutch port to check any seaward movement that the Allied squadron might attempt. Meanwhile, the British ambassador-pressed the Government of the Dutch Republic to return both Serapis and Countess Of Scarborough to England, failing that he demanded that Jones' squadron be expelled from Texel and thus forced into the jaws of the Royal Navy's blockading squadron.
Indeed, on 12 November, the Netherlands Navy had moved a squadron of line-of-battle ships to Texel, and its commanding officer ordered Jones to sail with the first favorable wind. Nevertheless, the adroit Commodore managed to stall his departure for over six weeks. By that time, he had managed to restore Alliance to top trim and to ready her for sea. Since the other ships in his squadron had by this time, for complex diplomatic and legalistic reasons, shifted to flying French colors Jones decided to leave them behind when he left Holland in Alliance. He had long since relieved Landais in command of that frigate.

On the 13th, he wrote to Franklin: "We hear that the enemy still keeps a squadron cruising off here, but this shall not prevent my attempts to depart whenever the wind will permit. I hope we have recovered the trim of this ship, which was entirely lost during the last cruise, and I do not much fear the enemy in the long and dark nights of this season. The ship is well manned and shall not be given away. I need not tell you I will do my utmost to take prisoners and prizes in my way from hence." About this time Captain Conyngham, who had escaped from prison in England and had crossed over to Holland, came aboard the Alliance.

Benjamin Franklin wrote to the Navy Board the following letter in regards to Captain Landais behavior:

Passy, March 15, 1780.
Gentlemen: I acquainted you in a former letter that there were great misunderstandings between Captain Landais and the other officers of his ship. These differences arose to such a height that the captain once wrote me he would quit the command rather than continue with them. Some of them leaving the ship, that disturbance seemed to be quieted. But there has since arisen another violent quarrel between himself and Captain Jones. These things give me great trouble, particularly the latter, the circumstances of which I am under a necessity of communicating to you, that measures may be taken for putting properly an end to it by a court-martial, if you find that step necessary. Soon after the arrival of our little squadron in the Texel I had a letter from Commodore Jones, complaining highly of Captain Landais, and mentioning that he was advised to put him under arrest in order to his trial by a court-martial, for which, however, there was not a sufficient number of officers in Europe. But he would do nothing in it until he heard from me. I had another from Captain Landais, complaining of Commodore Jones, and begging me to order inquiry into the matter as soon as possible. I received also a letter from the minister of the marine, of which the following is an extract viz:
Je suis persuadé, monsieur, que vous n'aurez pas été moins touché que moi de la perte du grand nombre de volontaires Français qui ont été tués dans le combat du Bonhomme Richard contre le vaisseau de guerre anglois le Serapis. Cet événement est d'autant plus fâcheux, qu'il paroit que si la frégate américaine L'Alliance avoit secondé le Bonhomme Richard en combattant en même tenir l'avantage remporté par le Comm. Jones, auroit été plus prompte, auroit conté moins de moude, et n'auroit pas mis le Bonhomme Richard dans le cas de couler bas trente-six heures après le combat. Le Capitaine de cette frégate ayant tenu une conduite très extraordinaire, je ne doute pas monsieur, que vous ne lui mandiez de se rendre auprès de vous pour en rendre compte, et que dans le cas où vous reconnoitrez que c'est par sa faute que la victoire a couté tant de sang, vous me jugiez à propos d'en informer le Congrès, à fin qu'il fasse rayer le Capitaine de dessus la liste des officiers de sa marine, etc.

Upon this, and with the advice of a very respectable friend of Captain Landais, M. de Chaumont, who thought sending for him to come to Paris, in order to an inquiry into his conduct, would prevent many inconveniences to the service that might attend a more public discussion, I wrote to him October 15, acquainting him with the principal heads of the charges against him, and directing him to render himself
here, bringing with him such papers and testimonies as he might think useful in his justification. I wrote at the same time to Commodore Jones to send up such proofs as he might have in support of the charges against the captain, that I might be enabled to give a just account of the affair to Congress. In two or three weeks Captain Landais came to Paris, but I received no answer from Commodore Jones. After waiting some days I concluded to hear Captain Landais on the 15th of November, without longer delay, and that the impartiality of the inquiry might be more clear I requested the above named, a friend of Captain Landais, and Dr. Bancroft, a friend of Commodore Jones, to be present. With this I send the minutes that were taken on that occasion.
The justification Captain Landais offers in answer to the charge of disobedience of the commodore's orders seems to call on me for an explanation of what relates to those I had given Captain Landais. The armament was made at l'Orient. M. de Chaumont was present there, and had the care of it. I was necessarily at a great distance, and could not be consulted on every occasion, and I was not on the following. A convoy being wanted for some merchant ships to Bordeaux, and our squadron being ready, and there being time sufficient, it was employed in and performed that occasional service. The Alliance and Bon Homme Richard afterwards at sea ran foul of each other in the night, the latter received great damages; and all returned to L'Orient, the state of the crew, as well as that of the ship, making it at first doubtful whether the Bon Homme Richard might not be long detained in port. I was applied to for the conditional order I gave on the 28th of July to Captain Landais. I could not foresee that he would think a cruise, for which he was to take on board six months' provisions and during which he was to be under the orders of Commodore Jones, was accomplished by the little trip to Bordeaux and the return above mentioned, and that he was therefore no longer under those orders. Nor could I imagine that a conditional order for cruising alone, in case the Bon Homme Richard could not be ready in time, would, if she was ready, and they sailed together, be construed into an exemption from that subordination in a squadron which regular discipline and the good of the service requires, otherwise I should certainly have removed those misapprehensions by fresh and very explicit orders. How far Captain Landais is justifiable in those interpretations and his consequent conduct must be left to his proper judges.
The absence of Commodore Jones and of all the witnesses, so that none of them could be cross-examined, have made this inquiry very imperfect. You will perceive that contradictions appear in the evidence on both sides in some very material points. Those, with my ignorance in the maneuvering of ships engaged, and their possible operations under all the variety of circumstances that wind, tide, and situation afford, make it as impracticable for me to form, as it would be improper
for me without authority to give, a judgment in this affair. I will only take the liberty of saying in favor of Captain Landais that, notwithstanding the mortal quarrel that rose between them at sea, it does not appear to me at all probable he fired into the Bon Homme Richard with design to kill Captain Jones. The inquiry, though imperfect, and the length of it, have, however, had one good effect in preventing hitherto a duel between the parties, that would have given much scandal, and which I believe will now not take place, as both expect justice from a court-martial in America.
I have the honor to be, gentlemen, etc.


On the morning of 27 December, after foul weather had forced the British blockaders off their stations, an easterly wind sprang up and enabled Alliance to stand out to sea. She dropped the pilot an hour before noon and headed southwest along the Netherlands coast. Less than a day later, the frigate transited Dover Strait and entered the English Channel. On the night of 31 December, she was off Ushant, an island off the westernmost tip of Brittany, when 1779 gave way to 1780. For a bit over a fortnight thereafter, she cruised to the south looking for British shipping; but, with the exception of one small English brig that she took, the ship encountered only friendly or neutral vessels.
With her best American colors flying, the Alliance "…passed along the Flemish banks and getting to windward of the enemy's fleets of observation in the North Sea…" ran through the Straits of Dover in full view of the British fleet in the Downs. During the night of December 28 several vessels were seen and the next morning the frigate passed "..the Isle of Wight, in view of the enemy's fleet at Spithead, and in two days more got safe through the channel, having passed by windward in sight of several of the enemy's large two-decked cruising ships…" Jones then cruised a week or more to the southward and off Cape Finisterre. January 8, 1780, he captured a brig, which he sent to America. He went into Coruna January 16, where he was well received by the Spanish. Conyngham left the Alliance here and joined a ship bound to America. Jones sailed on January 28, in company with the French frigate Le Sensible. Want of winter clothing then prevented Jones from beginning an extended cruise in quest of prizes; and, instead, the ship struggled across the Bay of Biscay against head wind along a roughly northeasterly course toward L'Orient. In route, she recaptured a wine-laden French barque-a prized by an English privateer-and saved the foundering vessel's cargo before the barque sank. She also chanced upon Livingston and escorted that tobacco-laden American merchantman to the French coast.
Alliance anchored in Groix Roads on 10 February and moved into L'Orient harbor on the 19th. That day, Benjamin Franklin suggested that Jones take on a cargo of arms and uniform cloth for the American Army and promptly get underway for home. He also found the Serapis awaiting condemnation. She, the Countess of Scarborough and Pallas had gone from the Texel to Dunkirk, whence the Serapis had proceeded to L'Orient. She was eventually sold there, and the Countess of Scarborough at Dunkirk.

Captain Jones had to endure another long period of waiting on shore, being occupied for some time in giving the Alliance a thorough overhauling; for lack of money, this was less complete than he had hoped.
Jones description of the state of Alliance: “She had not one good sail; had left the Texel with only one anchor, and had I not procured two new cables from Amsterdam after I left the Serapis I should have lost the Alliance at the Texel. I never found a frigate in so bad a condition. Epidemical disorders raged among the crew; the officers always drinking grog, and there was a total want of subordination and negligence. The cutwater was loosened by laying in the trough of the swell in a gale of wind while separated from the squadron in the North Sea. I was obliged to secure it with an hawser. The bowsprit was too long, ran out too much in a horizontal line, and the ballast was a considerable part of it laid before the magazine in the fore peek and on the breast-hooks, the rest was ranged along the wings, cleated up at a very considerable distance from the keel and above the dead rising. The remainder of it was laid in the after peek and on the transom. The two fore guns had been carried run out over the bow, the after guns run out at the stern ports. The topmasts yards and rigging were large enough for a sixty-gun ship, and the tops were so ill-made and so narrow as to give the masts no proper support. It is impossible to imagine a worse arrangement than that of the store-rooms. They were divided and subdivided into little closets, nooks, and winding passages, and instead of being adapted to contain the ship's stores, appeared only fit to lodge dirt and increase the quantity of rats, already immense. The magazine was not only inconvenient, but very insecure from fire, etc. There was no fit orlop for the cables, and the sail-room could contain at most one of the spare courses. The deck was burnt through under the hearth, and the bottoms of the copper burnt out. Many obstructions of useless hatchways, etc., were in the way of the recoil of the guns, and the gangways were so ill-contrived as neither to afford a convenient passage from the quarter-deck to the forecastle, nor cover the men at the guns in the waist. The mizzenmast stood too close to the mainmast, the ship was very crank, plunged very deep in a head sea, and could neither sail nor work as a frigate. I began to put that ship in order immediately on my taking command, and after my arrival at L'Orient the essential repairs were finished early in April by the crew of the ship and four or five American carpenters hired from the Luzerne to assist ours. The materials of the old arrangement did not fall much short of finishing the new. Judges have allowed that when the business was finished everything about that frigate was perfect”.
He seems to have had an idea that the French government would bear the cost of repairs on the Alliance. Franklin wrote to him, February 19: "As to refitting your ship at the expense of this court, I must acquaint you that there is not the least probability of obtaining it, and therefore I cannot ask it. I hear too much already of the extraordinary expense you made in Holland to think of proposing an addition to it, especially as you seem to impute the damage she has sustained more to Capt. Landais's negligence than to accidents of the cruize. The whole expense will therefore fall upon me and I am ill provided to bear it, having so many unexpected calls upon me from all quarters. I therefore beg you would have mercy upon me, put me to as little charge as possible and take nothing that you can possibly do without. As to sheathing with copper, it is totally out of the question. I am not authorised to do it, if I had money; and I have not money for it, if I had orders. The purchase of the Serapis is in the same predicament . . . Let me repeat it, for God's sake be sparing, unless you mean to make me a bankrupt or have your drafts dishonored for want of money in my hands to pay them."
In spite of difficulties, however, the ship was in fine condition by the middle of April. Jones took on board twenty-eight eighteen-pounders and twelve nines, the guns that had been made for the BonHomme Richard, but were not ready in time; besides which it had been decided that eighteens were too heavy. Probably these guns were destined to America, and not mounted on the Alliance. Jones expected to return to America in the Alliance, but wished before he left France to settle his own and his men's affairs-his prizes not yet sold, his crew without wages, without prize money, and without clothes. In order to expedite matters, Jones made another trip to Paris and obtained the promise of an early sale. Franklin advanced a sum of money to supply the immediate needs of officers and men. The French government loaned the ship Ariel of twenty guns to accompany the Alliance to America and assist in transporting a large amount of clothing and military supplies for the Continental army. Many exchanged American prisoners arrived from England who would be available for her crew. Jones was received in Paris with marked distinction and was presented by the King with a gold-hilted sword and the cross of the Order of Military Merit; the latter in the following year, after having obtained the approval of Congress.

Jones agreed with Franklin's suggestion, this kept him in France for many months thereafter, attending to military, diplomatic, and social matters, which he felt to be important to his country, to his crew, and to himself. Most of this time, he was away from his ship in Paris.

During Jones's absence from L'Orient, Landais, instigated by Arthur Lee, encouraged a spirit of discontent almost amounting to mutiny among the crew of the Alliance. The men, led to believe that Jones was responsible for their not receiving the prize money due them, demanded the restoration of Landais to the command of the ship. Apparently, Jones here again, as on the Ranger, suffered from the lack of a warm personal regard for him on the part of his men, who, repelled by his demeanor, never understood his devotion to their interests. The former officers and men of the BonHomme Richard, however, stood by him. Lee expressed the opinion that as Landais's commission was not been revoked, nor had he been relieved by order of Congress, he was still legally in command of the Alliance. Jones wrote to Robert Morris: "I am convinced that Mr. Lee has acted in this matter merely because I would not become the enemy of the venerable, the wise and good Franklin, whose heart as well as head does and will always do honor to human nature." In regard to the legality of Landais's commission, the Board of Admiralty in a report to Congress a few months later observed that "Captain Landais regained command of the Alliance by the advice of Mr. Lee, notwithstanding his suspension by Dr. Franklin, who by the direction of the Marine Committee had the sole management of our marine affairs in Europe." John Adams, however, believed that the Marine Committee lacked authority to confer upon Franklin the power to remove the commander of a ship. Commodore Gillon of South Carolina, at that time in France, also took the part of Landais. The French ministry declined to take sides in the controversy. June 13, after Jones's return from Paris but during his temporary absence from the ship, Landais went on board and took command. Alliance weighed anchor and moved to Port Louis, where a recently emplaced boom blocked her path. The batteries that guarded the port, as well as three French warships, had received orders to fire on the frigate it she attempted to stand out to sea. To avoid trouble, which might be serious and lead to bloodshed, Jones relinquished his claim to the command.

About 1 July the Alliance sailed for America with Arthur Lee on board as passenger, but without the clothing so much needed by the army. The conduct of Captain Landais became so erratic during the voyage that the safety of the ship, crew, and passengers seemed imperiled. Landais quarreled with his officers, abused his men, and made life miserable for his passengers. The ship had hardly lost sight of land when he locked up Capt. Matthew Parke because the commanding officer of the embarked Marine Corps contingent refused to swear unconditional obedience under all possible circumstances. Any seamen who had joined the frigate after BonHomme Richard had sunk were suspected of disloyalty, many were shackled and imprisoned in the ship's rat-infested hold. Even Arthur Lee, who had urged the Frenchman to take command, came close to being stabbed with a carving knife for taking the first slice of roast pig at dinner. In operating and navigating the ship, Landais gave orders that violated the rules of safe and sensible seamanship.
The fearful and exasperated officers and passengers finally agreed that the commanding officer must be insane, and they forcibly relieved him of command, which devolved upon the first lieutenant. This was on August 10, in latitude 41° 30' north, longitude 59° west. Course was set for Boston, where she arrived, August 16. On September 5 Captain Barry was appointed to command the Alliance.
Barry arrived at Boston on 19 September with orders stripping Landais of all claim to command of the frigate. That unfortunate officer had shut himself up in the captain's cabin and refused to leave, and required force by a party of marines led by his first adversary of the voyage, Capt. Parke to remove him from the ship.
She remained in Boston Harbor during the rest of the year and on board of her was convened the court martial, of which Barry was president, for the trial of Captain Landais and his first lieutenant, James Degge, both of whom were dismissed from the navy.

Alliance fitted out at Boston for another voyage to France as soon as the court martial of Captain Landais was over. There was the usual delay and difficulty in recruiting a crew for the ship and an application was made to the state government for authority to impress seamen and to enlist soldiers. The former request was denied, but permission was obtained to enroll volunteers from the guard at the castle and it was again necessary to take a considerable number of British prisoners. A turbulent ship's company was the consequence and a sanguinary brawl on Long Wharf with the crews of two French frigates was an early result. Meanwhile, efforts to restore Alliance to fighting trim progressed slowly-when they moved at all-because of a dearth of both men and money. Funds for the necessary yard work and for provisioning and manning the ship were slow in reaching Boston until Col. John Laurens-a former aide-de-camp to General Washington, a successful battlefield commander, and an exchanged prisoner of war-appeared there on 25 January 1781. Congress had appointed Laurens as its envoy extraordinary to France because his military experience seemed to fit him to become a convincing spokesman for Washington's needy army. It had also selected Alliance as the speediest and safest ship to carry the dashing young officer to Europe. The urgency of Alliance's new mission made the funds and crew available so that the ship was ready to sail by the end of the first week of February. A favorable wind came up on the 11th enabling her to depart Nantasket Roads and stand out to sea.
Five days later, she entered crowded ice fields and suffered "considerable damage" as she forced her way through. Her crew contained many British sailors, a group of who plotted to take over the frigate and to kill all her officers but one who, spared would be required to navigate the vessel to an English port. Barry took careful precautions to prevent the mutiny from erupting, and had the would be mutineers arrested.
While she sailed eastward, Barry generally refused to pursue any shipping that would delay his progress, however, on 4 March; the frigate encountered a ship and a schooner. One shot brought both vessels to. The schooner proved to be the English privateer Alert and her consort was Buono Campagnia, a Venetian ship prized the Britisher had recently taken. Barry took Alert as a prize, but released the merchantman. Five days later, on 9 March, the frigate anchored in Groix Roads and disembarked her important passenger and his three companions: Thomas Paine, whose writings had exerted great influence in persuading the colonies to seek independence, Major William Jackson, a Continental Army officer from South Carolina, and the Viscount de Noailles , a cousin of Lafayette.

March 29, the Alliance got under way for her return voyage in company with a large French East Indiaman letter of marque called the Marquis de Lafayette, loaded with military stores for the Continental Army. Soon after sailing, another attempt at mutiny was discovered on the Alliance. John Kessler, mate of the frigate, who wrote a narrative of her voyages, says that "on March 30th an Indian, one of the forecastle men, gave Captain Barry information of a combination among the crew for the purpose of taking the ship, and pointing out three who had strove to prevail on him to be concerned therein. The three men were immediately put in irons and all the officers, with such of the crew as could be confided in, were armed and required to remain all night on deck. On the next morning all hands were called and placed on the forecastle, booms, and gangways, excepting the officers and such part of the crew in whom Captain Barry confided, who, armed, strongly guarded the quarter deck, the steerage, and the main deck, to keep the remainder of the crew together on the forecastle and boom. The three designated men were brought out of their irons on the quarter and, being stripped and hoisted by the thumbs to the mizzen stay, underwent a very severe whipping before either would make any confession. The names of 25 of their accomplices were obtained from them before the whipping was discontinued. As their accomplices were disclosed, they were called to the quarterdeck, stripped and tied to the ridge-rope of the netting and the whipping continued until it was thought all were disclosed that could possibly be obtained, which proved to be. That it was intended to take the ship on her passage out by killing all the officers in the middle watch of the night, except the second Lieutenant, P. Fletcher, who was to navigate her to some port in Ireland, or on failure, to be destroyed. A quartermaster, one of the mutineers, was to have command. They had all been bound by an oath on the Bible administered by the Captain's assistant cabin steward, and had also signed their names in a round robin so-called, but that they found no good opportunity on the outward passage and intended to accomplish the taking of the ship as aforesaid immediately on leaving France. But on coming out of L'Orient we lost a man overboard who was one of the chief ringleaders and they considering that as a bad omen, threw the round robin overboard and relinquished their designs. The three principles were placed securely in irons and the remainder, after being admonished by Captain Barry and on their solemn declaration to conduct themselves well, were permitted to return to ship's duty." The three principals, sentenced to death, escaped the ultimate punishment for their crimes, this penalty never being carried out in their case.

At dawn on 2 April, a lookout sighted two ships to the northwest; Barry headed toward the strangers and ordered the Indiaman to follow. Undaunted, the distant vessels-which proved to be two British brigs- continued to approach the little American convoy and fired a broadside at the frigate as they passed abreast. Two answering salvoes from Alliance robbed the larger English vessel of her rigging and forced her to strike her colors. She proved to be a brig with flush deck and 20 twelve pounders, two six pounders and 14 [four-pound coehorns], with 112 men, called the Mars and belonging to the Guernsey. The crew were taken aboard the Alliance and all put in irons without distinction, Captain Barry considering them as not meriting other treatment in consequence of their firing on us with no intention of bravely fighting.

Barry ordered Marquis De Lafayette to attend to the captured foe while he pursued and took the second brig. Marquis De Lafayette provided the prize crew for the smaller vessel, a Jersey privateer named Minerva of 10 guns and 55 men. Barry ordered the prize master of this vessel to head for Philadelphia but Marquis De Lafayette's captain had secretly ordered him to head for France if he had a chance to slip away. On the night of 17 April, foul weather separated Mars from the convoy. Nevertheless, that prize dutifully continued on toward the Delaware capes. Minerva slipped away during the next night and apparently set course for the Bay of Biscay. Marquis De Lafayette dropped out of sight during a fierce storm on the night of the 25th.
After spending two days looking for her lost charge, Alliance continued toward America alone. On 2 May, she took two sugar-laden ships out of Jamaica. Off Newfoundland Banks later that day, the frigate sighted, but escaped the attention of a large convoy from Jamaica and its Royal Navy escorts. Ironically, a few days before, the missing Marquis De Lafayette and her treacherous master had fallen prey to this same British force.
Almost continuous bad weather plagued Barry's little force in the days that followed until Alliance permanently lost sight of her two prizes on 12 May. During a tempest on the 17th, lightning shattered the frigate's main topmast and carried away her main yard while damaging her foremast and injuring almost a score of men.

An action was fought, May 29, with the British ship Atalanta and brig Trepassey in about north latitude 40° and west longitude 63°, which is described by Kessler. "Towards evening [of the 28th] discovered two sail on the weather bow standing for us and which after coming near enough to be kept in sight, hauled to wind and stood on our course. Towards day it became quite calm. After it became light it appeared that they were an armed ship and brig, about a league distant. At sunrise they hoisted the English colors and beat drum. At the same time the American colors were displayed by the Alliance. By little puffs of wind we were enabled to get within short hailing distance." At eleven o'clock the ships hailed each other. Barry learned that she the sloop of war Atalanta. Her smaller consort proved to be the brig Trepassey. The American captain then identified his own vessel and invited Atalanta's commanding officer surrender. A few moments later, Barry opened the inevitable battle with a broadside. The enemy ships immediately pulled out of field of fire of the frigate's broadsides and took positions where their guns could pound her with near impunity In the motionless air, Alliance-too large to be propelled sweeps-was powerless to maneuver.
Kessler continued, "The firing then began, but unfortunately there was not wind enough for our steerage way and they being lighter vessels, by using sweeps got and kept athwart our stern and on our quarters, so that we could not bring one-half our guns, nay, oft time only one gun out astern to bear on them, and thus laying like a log the greatest part of the time. About two o'clock Captain Barry received a wound by a grape shot in the shoulder. He remained, however, on the quarter deck until by the much loss of blood he was obliged to be helped to the cock-pit. Some time after, our colors were shot away and it so happened that at the same time such guns as would bear on them had been fired and were then loading, and which led the enemy to think we had struck the colors, and manned their shrouds and gave three cheers; by that time the colors were hoisted by a mizen brail and our firing again began. A quartermaster went to the wheel in place of one just killed there. At the moment a small breeze of wind happening, a broadside was brought to bear and fired on the ship and then one on the brig, when they struck their colors at three o'clock.".
Lieutenant Hoysted Hacker, assumed command of the ship when Barry was taken below for treatment, fought the ship valiantly, but despaired of victory with out being able to maneuver the ship to effectively bring her guns to bear. He approached the captain in his cabin where his wounds were being dressed and said, "I have to report the ship in frightful condition, Sir. The rigging is much cut, damage everywhere great, many men killed and wounded, and we labor under great disadvantage for want of wind. Have I permission to strike our colors?" Barry angrily replied, "No Sir, the thunder! If this ship cannot be fought without me, I will be brought on deck; to your duty, Sir."
Inspired by Barry's zeal, Hacker returned to the fray. A wind sprang up and restored the battered frigate's steerageway, enabling her to bring her battery back into action. Two devastating broadsides knocked Trepassey out of the fight. Another broadside forced Atalanta to strike, ending the bloody affair.

Captain Edwards of the Atalanta, testifying at his court martial, said of the Alliance that when "about two cables lengths to leeward she hoisted Rebel colours and fir'd a Shot across us. I immediately hoisted our colours, when she fired her broadside, wore, and as soon as on the other tack and her Guns woud bear, kept a constant Fire on us; our Firing began on her, but being at too great a distance, I ceast our Fire and endeavour'd to get nearer to her, which having effected she haild us, said she was the Alliance continental Frigate and desired we would strike." Edwards tried to keep up a conversation until the Trepassey could close, but the Alliance began the action again. The Trepassey was so anxious to get up that she passed under the stern of the Alliance "with too much way and in hauling under her Quarter, shot abreast of her; in this situation she received two broadsides." The Atalanta, brought under the frigate's stern and got between her and the Trepassey. The Atalanta continued the action an hour and a half longer, nearly three hours in all; she was then so greatly disabled in masts, yards, sails, and rigging as to be unmanageable. It was accordingly necessary to strike and the Trepassey, unable to get away, struck also. The Atalanta's mainmast soon went over the side. The master of the Trepassey, describing the battle, says that the Alliance, at a distance of half a mile to leeward, "hoisted rebel colours and gave the Atalanta and us a broadside, we being then very nigh to each other; we then 'bore up close alongside of her, the Atalanta on the starboard and the Trepassey on the larboard quarter, and began to engage. About an hour after the action began Capt. Smith of the Trepassey was killed."

The Atalanta, which carried sixteen guns and a hundred and twenty-five men, lost six killed and eighteen wounded; the Trepassey, with fourteen guns and eighty men, lost six killed, including the captain and eleven wounded. The Alliance’s loss was five killed, including the lieutenant of marines, and twenty-two wounded, three of them mortally. Captain Barry agreed with the British to send the Trepassey as a cartel to Halifax with all his other prisoners, about two hundred and fifty in number, to be exchanged for Americans; before entering upon this service the Trepassey's guns were thrown overboard. She arrived in due time at Halifax. The Atalanta, dismasted in the engagement, was fitted with jury masts, and put in charge of Hezekiah Welch, second lieutenant of the Alliance as prize master. Some weeks later, in the Vice-Admiralty Court at Halifax, Welch testified that he was ordered by Captain Barry "to take possession of the Atalanta and proceed with her to Boston, New England; that on their passage thither the 7th June last, being near Cape Cod, they fell in with His Majesty's ships of War the Assurance, Charlestown, Amphitrite and Vulture, which retook the said sloop Atalanta, put a British officer & Seamen on board her & sent her safe into this Port of Halifax”. After more patching her battered hull and rigging, Alliance set out the next day and reached Boston on 6 June.
While Barry recuperated, Lack of funds once again delayed Alliance’s repairs. Lord Cornwallis surrendered his army at Yorktown; ending the war's last major action on land, well before she was ready for sea. Again, the decision to use the frigate to carry an important person to France hastened her repairs. Lafayette-who had completed his work in America with a major role in the Yorktown campaign-arrived in Boston on 10 December 1781, wanting to return home.
Finally, frigate could muster a complete crew, through the efforts of the French minister a number of French sailors were obtained and some of the Continental frigate Deane's crew transferred to the Alliance to supplement those men already signed on. She sailed December 23, 1781, and in spite of her orders to avoid all vessels, she made a prize of a large ship from Jamaica that she sent into Boston. The ship arrived off L'Orient on 17 January 1782, disembarked Lafayette, and his party.

Barry wanted to make a cruise in European waters to capture British shipping who’s seamen could be used to free American prisoners by exchange. Alliance got underway in February and headed for the Bay of Biscay. Accompanying her out was the American letter-of- marque brig Antonio bound for home. Three days later, she chased and overhauled an American brigantine that jettisoned her guns in an effort escape. Antonio's commander offered to escort the unfortunate, and now defenseless, merchantman to Philadelphia and they parted from Barry the next day. Alliance encountered only friendly and neutral shipping before putting in at L'Orient on February.

Barry remained in port more than two weeks awaiting dispatches from Paris containing Franklin's observations on the diplomatic scene and on prospects for England's recognition American independence and negotiations for peace. The messages arrived on 15 March, and the following day Alliance head home.
Wretched weather and contrary winds plagued the ship for much of the voyage. The almost incessant northerly blasts forced her south into hot, unhealthful climes. Eight men died before the end of April when she managed to turn north with the trade winds and head for the Delaware River.

The frigate reached Cape Henlopen on 10 May, but found it guarded by a Royal Navy 64 gun ship of the line which-in company with a tender-gave chase. Fleeing south and eluding her pursuers, Alliance turned north around Montauk Point a across Long Island Sound to New London, Conn., where arrived she on 13 May. Frustrated by the inevitable shortages of men, money, and material, Berry’s attempt to return to sea as soon as possible after his arrival failed.
The Alliance sailed from New London, August 4, 1782, on a cruise. Soon after leaving port, she recaptured a prize brig. Barry sent home a narrative of this cruise, dated L'Orient, October 18, saying that he "proceeded as fast as possible off Bermudas; in my way I took a schooner from that place for Halifax. After cruizing off there for twelve or fifteen days, I retook a sloop from New London and sent her for Cape Francois. Finding the prizes I had taken of little value either to myself or country and in all likelihood should be obliged to return into port soon for want of men, was determined to alter my cruizing ground. I therefore thought it best to run off the banks of Newfoundland. In my way there I fell in with a whaling brigantine with a pass from admiral Digby; I mann'd her and sent her for Boston. A few days after, off the banks of Newfoundland, I took a brigantine from Jamaica bound to London, loaded with sugar and rum, and sent her for Boston; by this vessel I found the Jamaica fleet were to the eastward of us. I then carried a press of sail for four days; the fifth day I took two ships that had parted from the fleet. After manning them and having a fresh gale westwardly, I thought best to order them for France; a day or two after, I took a snow and a ship belonging to the same fleet. Being short of water and a number of prisoners on board, the westwardly winds still blowing fresh, and in expectation of falling in with some more of them, I thought it best to proceed to France, with a determined view to get those I had already taken in safe, and after landing the prisoners, to put out immediately; but meeting with blowing weather and a high sea, I lost the rails of the head and was in great danger of losing the head, which accident obliged me to put in here where I arrived yesterday with the above four prizes. After repairing the damages and getting what the ship may want, I shall put to sea on a cruize. I have likewise to inform you that the Ramilies, admiral Graves' ship, foundered, but all the crew were saved, several of which were on the prizes I took."

Several officers of the Alliance, being dissatisfied at not having received their pay, refused obedience to the captain and Barry ordered them under arrest. He was unable to obtain others to take their places, and was obliged to sail with inexperienced lieutenants promoted from the lower grades. The Alliance sailed from L'Orient, December 8, on a cruise. January 8, 1783, she arrived at Martinique, where Barry found orders to proceed to Havana. On the way there he was chased by a British fleet and again by a seventy-four and a frigate. At Havana, he found the twenty-gun ship Duc de Lauzun, purchased by Morris for the Continental navy. Barry's orders were to sail at once for the United States with this vessel in company and with a quantity of specie for the use of Congress. After a delay of about three weeks, partially do to Havana’s embargo closing that port. The Alliance and the Duc de Lauzun, Captain Green, sailed March 6, on the 10th, they saw three sail, which gave chase. The strangers turned out to be the British frigates Alarm and Sybil, and the sloop Tobago.
The headmost, the Alarm, got within gunshot of the Alliance and they exchanged fire, while the other two were fast coming up with the Duc de Lauzun. She was a dull sailor and Barry feared that if he stood by her, the result would be the capture of both American ships. He advised Green to heave his guns overboard and ran off before the wind, taking this advice; all but two or three of them thrown over. Another sail soon appeared-that of a French ship of fifty guns lately out of Havana. Barry was thereupon encouraged and looked for help from this ship. At this time, the Alliance had dropped astern, nearer the Duc de Lauzun, countering this maneuver, Alarm shortened sail and held off from them. The Sybil got within gunshot of the Duc de Lauzun and opened fire with her bow chasers, and receiving return fire from the Duc de Lauzun’s stern chasers. Confident in both Alliance's speed and her fighting ability, Barry maneuvered her between Sybil and Duc De Lauzun to demand the full attention of the former so that the latter might slip away to safety. Kessler, the mate of the Alliance, says: "Captain Barry went from gun to gun on the main deck, cautioning against too much haste and not to fire until the enemy was right abreast. He ordered the main topsail hove to the mast, that the enemy (who had already fired a Bow gun, the shot of which struck into the cabin of the Alliance) might come up as soon as he was abrest, when the action began and before an half hour her guns were silenced and nothing but Musketry was fired from her. She appeared very much injured in her hull. She was of 32 guns and appeared very full of men, and after an action of 45 minutes She sheered off." The Alliance lost ten wounded, one of them mortally; the Sybil, two killed and six wounded.
The log of the Sybil records that the American vessels were sighted at half-past five in the morning and the British then gave chase; at eleven, the Alliance showed Continental colors. At half-past eleven "the Comr (Commodore, evidently meaning the Alarm.) fired two or three broadsides at the large ship, who returned it; we were at this time about 3 miles astern of the Comre. The Tobago was abreast of us carrying a press of sail to get up." Twenty minutes later the Sybil got into action with the Alliance and received considerable injury to sails and rigging. At half-past twelve "a large ship bore down to the ship we Engaged, wch obliged us to sheer off." Kessler's story continues: "As soon as the ship which we had engaged hove from us, her consorts joined her and all made sail, after which the French ship came down to us and Captain Barry asked them why they did not come down during the action. They answered that they thought we might have been taken and the signal known and the action only a sham to decoy him.”

They then chased the British, but with the French 4th rate much slower then the frigates the pursuit had to be abandoned. The voyage was then continued. The Alliance and Due de Lauzun separated off Cape Hatteras. Finding two British cruisers off the Delaware capes, the Alliance bore away for Newport, arriving there March 20. The Due de Lauzun got into Philadelphia on the 21st. The battle between the Alliance and the Sybil was doubtless the last naval action of the Revolution, with the possible exception of some privateering exploit. Provisional articles of peace had been signed at Paris, November 30, 1782, and January 20, 1783.

Alliance continued on northward and arrived at Newport R.I., at mid afternoon on 20 March 1783. Since British men-of-war could easily raid that port, she soon proceeded up Narragansett Bay and anchored just below Providence. There, her crew reduced to peacetime needs, underwent a thorough overhaul.

Ordered to proceed to Chesapeake Bay to take on a cargo of tobacco for shipment to Europe, the frigate got underway on 20 June, but, headed for sea, she struck a rock and stranded until high tide. Upon floating free, Alliance still seemed to be tight and resumed her voyage via the Virginia capes and the lower Chesapeake Bay to the Rappahannock. She then moved up that river where she began taking on tobacco. When completely loaded, she headed downstream on 21 August and sailed into the Atlantic three days later.
Soon after the ship entered the open sea, water rose rapidly in her hold. A hasty investigation revealed that a leak had developed where she had struck the rock weeks before. The crew's attempts to steam the influx failed, forcing Barry to head for the Delaware.
Further examination of the ship at Philadelphia ruled out any quick remedy and caused Congress to cancel the voyage. Her tobacco transferred to other ships to transport, her crew further reduced to the bare minimum necessary to keep her in reasonably satisfactory condition, Congress debated her fate.

There was a strong sentiment in favor of keeping this ship permanently in the national service, and on January 15, 1784, a committee of Congress reported that the honor of the flag and the protection of the coast required her repair. Many felt, however, that all naval expenditure should cease. The question was deliberated from time to time until May 23, 1785, when considerations of economy prevailed and a committee of Congress recommended the sale of the frigate. Sold on 1 August 1785 to John Coburn and a partner named Whitehead, subsequently they sold her to Robert Morris who converted the vessel to an East Indiaman. Her new owner-who, as the guiding spirit on naval matters in the Continental Congress and that body's Agent of Marine in the later years of the American struggle for independence, had directed her operations-selected Thomas Read as her master during her first merchant service. That former captain in the Continental Navy took her to China by a new route through the Dutch East Indies and the Solomon Islands. She departed Philadelphia in June 1787 and arrived at Canton on 22 December of that year. While passing through the Caroline’s on the outward voyage Read found two islands which were not on his chart and named the first-probably Ponape-Morris, and the second, Alliance. At Canton, he loaded the ship with tea, which he delivered back at Philadelphia on 17 September 1788, ending a record voyage.
Apparently, no details of Alliance's subsequent career have survived. However, when she was no longer seaworthy, the former frigate was abandoned, beached on Petty Island across the Delaware from Philadelphia. At low tide, some of her timbers appeared in the sands there until dredging operations destroyed her remaining hulk in 1901.


A Naval History of the American Revolution
Gardner W. Allen Boston, Houghton, 1913
Howard Chapelle, The History of the American Sailing Navy: the Ships and their Development (New York: Norton, 1949)
Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships
Samuel Eliot Morison, John Paul Jones (1959)
The Revolutionary Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States, Volume 3
Franklin to the Navy Board. 15 March 1780, pages 547-549
The Revolutionary Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States, Volume 3
Franklin to Sartine. March 20, 1780, pages 562-563.
The Revolutionary Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States, Volume 4
Paul Jones to John Brown, Secretary Board of Admiralty. Pages 293-294
Letters of Delegates to Congress: Volume 22 November 1, 1784 - November 6, 1785 Charles Thomson to Pierre Landais page 428
Letters of Delegates to Congress: Volume 22 November 1, 1784 - November 6, 1785 Commissioners of the Treasury page 840
Journals of the Continental Congress, 1774-1789
Thursday, April 8, 1784. page 210
American State Papers, House of Representatives, 10th Congress, 1st Session
Claims: Volume 1 Pages 346, 347
American State Papers, House of Representatives, 11th Congress, 2nd Session
Claims: Volume 1 Pages 373, 374, 375

Posted by Terry Shiflett on Wednesday 14th of January 2015 16:34

Continental Frigate Alliance

An agreement between two countries to support one another in case of war. In 1778, during the American Revolutionary War, the United States signed an alliance with France.
Other Names: None
L/B/D: l. 151'; b. 36'; dph. 12' 6"; s. 13 kts.
Tons: 900
Comp.: 300
Arm.: 28 12-pdrs 8 6-pdrs (designed) 28 12-pdrs 8 9-pdrs (operational)
Des.: Designer:/builder: William and James K. Hackett, Salisbury, Mass
Authorized: 20 November 1776
Laid down: 1777
Launched: 28 April 1778
Commissioned: 29 May 1778
Disposition: Sold 1 August 1785 to John Coburn, converted to an East Indiaman. When she was no longer seaworthy, she was abandoned off Petty Island across the Delaware River from Philadelphia. Her hulk was destroyed during dredging operations in 1901.

Detail of a Contemporary painting by Captain Matthew Parke, USMC, depicting Alliance passing Boston Lighthouse from sea, 1781

The Continental Congress authorized Alliance, which would be the only active Continental Frigate remaining in American hands at the end of American Revolutionary War on 20 November 1776. Constructed by William and James K. Hackett at Salisbury, Massachusetts, and launched 28 April 1777, after the usual delays, the result of the chronic lack of money & material that would plague the fledgling American Navy during the war. Moved to Boston Harbor about the middle of December, she fitted out for her first voyage.

Pierre Landais, formerly of the French Navy, and an experienced naval officer, having sailed around the world with the famous navigator Bougainville, became Alliance’s first commanding officer. He had embarked in the American cause and on the recommendation of Silas Deane. Highly regarded, he was appointed a captain in the Continental Navy, and Massachusetts made him an honorary citizen.
The frigates Deane, Captain Nicholson, and Alliance sailed together from Boston January 14 1779. The Alliance was bound for France, transporting Lafayette back to France to petition the French Court for increased support in the American struggle for independence. She parted with her consort on the third day out.
She arrived at Brest February 6, 1779, after a passage of twenty-three days from Boston. The voyage had not been without incident. She capturing two vessels, lost her main topmast in a storm, and on 2 February, a mutiny was discovered among the English and Irish sailors on board. The difficulty of recruiting ships' crews for the regular naval service, chiefly due to the superior attractions of privateering, had led to the practice in some cases of enlisting British prisoners, who were willing in this manner to escape confinement. In the case of the Alliance, the disinclination of Americans to sail under a French captain had increased the difficulty and accordingly many of the crew claimed to be British subjects. The unreliable character of such crews can be illustrated in this instance. Among the ringleaders of the conspiracy was one John Savage, master-at-arms, and William Murray, sergeant of marines. Murray confessed, saying, "that Savage and he, with 70 more, had agreed to take the ship and carry her into some part of England or Ireland, and force one of the Lieutenants to take command of her. He said the plan they had laid to take her was, that they were to divide themselves into four divisions, the first to take the magazine, the other three at the same time to force the cabbin, wardroom, and quarter deck, then to take command of the arm-chests, and in case of opposition, they were to point the fore-castle guns aft and fire them, the guns being 9 pounders and all loaded. The party that was to go to the magazine were to kill the Gunner, Carpenter and Boat-swain; the other punishments for the other officers and French gentlemen were thus: Captain Landais was to be put in irons and sent in the cutter, without victuals or drink; the Lieutenants were to walk overboard on a plank from the ship side, unless they would take charge of her and navigate the ship into England; the marine officers and the Doctor were to be hanged, quartered, and hove overboard; the sailing Master was to be tied up to the mizzen-mast, scarrified all over, cut to pieces, and hove overboard." Lafayette was to be put in irons and sent to England. Thirty-eight of the mutineers would be put ashore to await trial.

After the marquis and his suite had disembarked, Benjamin Franklin, one of the American commissioners in Paris, ordered her to remain in France despite the fact that Landais' original instructions had called for him to load the frigate with munitions and then to sail promptly for America. Instead, Franklin assigned the frigate to a squadron commanded by Capt. John Paul Jones.
The squadron departed Groix Roads, near L'Orient, France on 19 June to escort a convoy of merchantmen to Bordeaux and other French ports. On the night of the 20th the BonHomme Richard and Alliance fouled each other, carrying away the Richard's jib-boom and the Alliance's mizzen-mast. Jones considered Landais responsible for this accident, but Lieutenant Robinson of the Richard received court-martial and dismissal from service.

Trouble on board the Alliance caused Jones annoyance and perplexity, not knowing at first where to place the blame. There was a distinct lack of harmony between the Captain of the frigate and his officers and crew, Landais having a temperament that made impossible anything like efficient cooperation between him and either superiors or inferiors.

The French planned an invasion of southern England that summer, and asked Jones to carry out a diversionary raid in the northern British Isles. His flotilla sortied from Groix Roads on 14 August and headed for the southwestern corner of Ireland to begin n a clockwise circumnavigation of the British Isles.
Not many days passed before Landais-who in Jones' opinion had been the real culprit in the collision two months before-began to show his disinclination toward obeying orders. On the 23d, he was enraged when the commodore refused to allow him to chase a ship into shallow and unknown waters ". . . when there was not sufficient wind to govern a ship…" The next day, Jones later reported, Alliance's unruly captain came on board the flagship and addressed the commodore ". . . in the most gross and insulting terms..." From that point on, Landais seemed to ignore orders entirely and operated Alliance according to his own whims.

Thus, the only American warship in Jones' squadron belied her name by refusing to cooperate with the French vessels. She left her consorts during a squall on the night of 26 and 27 August and did not rejoin the squadron until 1 September. Betsy, a letter-of-marque ship she had just taken then accompanied the frigate. About this time, BonHomme Richard captured a similar ship named Union off Cape Wrath at the northwestern corner of Scotland, and Jones allowed Landais to man both vessels. The latter again showed his complete contempt for the commodore by sending the prizes to Bergan, Norway, where the Danish Government, not having recognized the independence of the American Colonies from Great Briton, declared their capture illegal. The Danes turned the ships over to the British consul, depriving their captors of the satisfaction of having hurt the enemy and of any hope of being rewarded for their efforts. (Captain Landis petitioned The United States Government in 1785, and again on 23 December 1807, as well as 5 February 1810 for redress in the matter, however the claims were denied, as the probability of the prizes making it to a port were they could have been legally sold was minimal).
In the next few days, Alliance took two more small ships prompting Jones to signal Landais to board BonHomme Richard for a conference. The American frigate's commander refused to obey, instead, sailing off once again.

For more than two weeks thereafter, Alliance worked her way south independently along the eastern shore of Great Britain while the remainder of the squadron followed a similar course from out of sight. A bit before midnight on 22 September, a lookout in BonHomme Richard reported seeing two ships.
Jones hoisted recognition signals, which were unanswered. Landais was continuing to ignore the flagship's efforts to communicate. Nevertheless, at dawn, Jones was able to recognize Alliance and Pallas, a frigate of his squadron, which had recently parted from the flagship with the Commodore's permission to hunt prizes.

About mid-afternoon on 23 September, the flagship sighted a large number of ships approaching from the north-northeast. The oncoming vessels were part of a convoy of British merchantmen, which had sailed from the Baltic Sea under the escort of the 44-gun frigate HMS Serapis (50) and the 20-gun hired armed sloop Countess of Scarborough. When the English vessels realized that strange warships were bearing down on them, the merchant ships turned shoreward while their two escorts headed toward the American force challenging it to battle.

Jones signaled his ships to form a line of battle, but Landais ignored the order and remained aloof from the action. During most of the ensuing four-hour battle off the chalk cliffs of Flamborough Head on England's Yorkshire coast, Alliance kept her distance from the action, which lasted well into the night. Some two hours after the first guns fired, Alliance entered the fray. When he saw her approach, Jones happily "...But, to his utter astonishment…" Landais' ship ". . . discharged a broadside full into the stern of the BonHomme Richard..." Jones and his crew ". . . called to him [Landais] for God's sake to forbear firing into the BonHomme Richard, yet he passed along off the side of the ship and continued firing..." However, Capt. Richard Pearson, who commanded Serapis, reported that Alliance was also firing into his ship. Thus, it appears that Landais was indiscriminately attacking both combatants.
Ignoring incredible damage to hull and rigging, as well as appalling loss of life, limb, and blood, each side continued to fight with unflagging determination and unshaken valor. Then, when it seemed that neither ship could remain much longer afloat, Serapis finally struck her colors.

Following the surrender, Alliance stood by during a desperate struggle to save the shattered, burning, leaking hulks. On the evening of the day after the battle, Jones realized that, while his flagship was doomed, her conquered opponent would probably survive. He, therefore, transferred his crew from BonHomme Richard to Serapis and, the next morning, sadly watched the former sink.
By 29 September, untiring labor had enabled Serapis to get underway, and the squadron headed for the coast of Holland. Alliance sighted land on the evening of 2 October and, the following morning, she anchored in Texel Roads, Amsterdam's deep-water harbor, with the rest of the squadron.

When word of the battle reached London, the Admiralty ordered its nearby men-of-war to search for Jones' flotilla, but the Royal Navy proceeded to look in all of the wrong places. By the time a merchantman informed London that Jones was at Texel Roads, the victorious Allies and their prizes had been safe at anchor there for a week. The Royal Navy then set up a tight blockade off the Dutch port to check any seaward movement that the Allied squadron might attempt. Meanwhile, the British ambassador-pressed the Government of the Dutch Republic to return both Serapis and Countess Of Scarborough to England, failing that he demanded that Jones' squadron be expelled from Texel and thus forced into the jaws of the Royal Navy's blockading squadron.
Indeed, on 12 November, the Netherlands Navy had moved a squadron of line-of-battle ships to Texel, and its commanding officer ordered Jones to sail with the first favorable wind. Nevertheless, the adroit Commodore managed to stall his departure for over six weeks. By that time, he had managed to restore Alliance to top trim and to ready her for sea. Since the other ships in his squadron had by this time, for complex diplomatic and legalistic reasons, shifted to flying French colors Jones decided to leave them behind when he left Holland in Alliance. He had long since relieved Landais in command of that frigate.

On the 13th, he wrote to Franklin: "We hear that the enemy still keeps a squadron cruising off here, but this shall not prevent my attempts to depart whenever the wind will permit. I hope we have recovered the trim of this ship, which was entirely lost during the last cruise, and I do not much fear the enemy in the long and dark nights of this season. The ship is well manned and shall not be given away. I need not tell you I will do my utmost to take prisoners and prizes in my way from hence." About this time Captain Conyngham, who had escaped from prison in England and had crossed over to Holland, came aboard the Alliance.

Benjamin Franklin wrote to the Navy Board the following letter in regards to Captain Landais behavior:

Passy, March 15, 1780.
Gentlemen: I acquainted you in a former letter that there were great misunderstandings between Captain Landais and the other officers of his ship. These differences arose to such a height that the captain once wrote me he would quit the command rather than continue with them. Some of them leaving the ship, that disturbance seemed to be quieted. But there has since arisen another violent quarrel between himself and Captain Jones. These things give me great trouble, particularly the latter, the circumstances of which I am under a necessity of communicating to you, that measures may be taken for putting properly an end to it by a court-martial, if you find that step necessary. Soon after the arrival of our little squadron in the Texel I had a letter from Commodore Jones, complaining highly of Captain Landais, and mentioning that he was advised to put him under arrest in order to his trial by a court-martial, for which, however, there was not a sufficient number of officers in Europe. But he would do nothing in it until he heard from me. I had another from Captain Landais, complaining of Commodore Jones, and begging me to order inquiry into the matter as soon as possible. I received also a letter from the minister of the marine, of which the following is an extract viz:
Je suis persuadé, monsieur, que vous n'aurez pas été moins touché que moi de la perte du grand nombre de volontaires Français qui ont été tués dans le combat du Bonhomme Richard contre le vaisseau de guerre anglois le Serapis. Cet événement est d'autant plus fâcheux, qu'il paroit que si la frégate américaine L'Alliance avoit secondé le Bonhomme Richard en combattant en même tenir l'avantage remporté par le Comm. Jones, auroit été plus prompte, auroit conté moins de moude, et n'auroit pas mis le Bonhomme Richard dans le cas de couler bas trente-six heures après le combat. Le Capitaine de cette frégate ayant tenu une conduite très extraordinaire, je ne doute pas monsieur, que vous ne lui mandiez de se rendre auprès de vous pour en rendre compte, et que dans le cas où vous reconnoitrez que c'est par sa faute que la victoire a couté tant de sang, vous me jugiez à propos d'en informer le Congrès, à fin qu'il fasse rayer le Capitaine de dessus la liste des officiers de sa marine, etc.

Upon this, and with the advice of a very respectable friend of Captain Landais, M. de Chaumont, who thought sending for him to come to Paris, in order to an inquiry into his conduct, would prevent many inconveniences to the service that might attend a more public discussion, I wrote to him October 15, acquainting him with the principal heads of the charges against him, and directing him to render himself
here, bringing with him such papers and testimonies as he might think useful in his justification. I wrote at the same time to Commodore Jones to send up such proofs as he might have in support of the charges against the captain, that I might be enabled to give a just account of the affair to Congress. In two or three weeks Captain Landais came to Paris, but I received no answer from Commodore Jones. After waiting some days I concluded to hear Captain Landais on the 15th of November, without longer delay, and that the impartiality of the inquiry might be more clear I requested the above named, a friend of Captain Landais, and Dr. Bancroft, a friend of Commodore Jones, to be present. With this I send the minutes that were taken on that occasion.
The justification Captain Landais offers in answer to the charge of disobedience of the commodore's orders seems to call on me for an explanation of what relates to those I had given Captain Landais. The armament was made at l'Orient. M. de Chaumont was present there, and had the care of it. I was necessarily at a great distance, and could not be consulted on every occasion, and I was not on the following. A convoy being wanted for some merchant ships to Bordeaux, and our squadron being ready, and there being time sufficient, it was employed in and performed that occasional service. The Alliance and Bon Homme Richard afterwards at sea ran foul of each other in the night, the latter received great damages; and all returned to L'Orient, the state of the crew, as well as that of the ship, making it at first doubtful whether the Bon Homme Richard might not be long detained in port. I was applied to for the conditional order I gave on the 28th of July to Captain Landais. I could not foresee that he would think a cruise, for which he was to take on board six months' provisions and during which he was to be under the orders of Commodore Jones, was accomplished by the little trip to Bordeaux and the return above mentioned, and that he was therefore no longer under those orders. Nor could I imagine that a conditional order for cruising alone, in case the Bon Homme Richard could not be ready in time, would, if she was ready, and they sailed together, be construed into an exemption from that subordination in a squadron which regular discipline and the good of the service requires, otherwise I should certainly have removed those misapprehensions by fresh and very explicit orders. How far Captain Landais is justifiable in those interpretations and his consequent conduct must be left to his proper judges.
The absence of Commodore Jones and of all the witnesses, so that none of them could be cross-examined, have made this inquiry very imperfect. You will perceive that contradictions appear in the evidence on both sides in some very material points. Those, with my ignorance in the maneuvering of ships engaged, and their possible operations under all the variety of circumstances that wind, tide, and situation afford, make it as impracticable for me to form, as it would be improper
for me without authority to give, a judgment in this affair. I will only take the liberty of saying in favor of Captain Landais that, notwithstanding the mortal quarrel that rose between them at sea, it does not appear to me at all probable he fired into the Bon Homme Richard with design to kill Captain Jones. The inquiry, though imperfect, and the length of it, have, however, had one good effect in preventing hitherto a duel between the parties, that would have given much scandal, and which I believe will now not take place, as both expect justice from a court-martial in America.
I have the honor to be, gentlemen, etc.


On the morning of 27 December, after foul weather had forced the British blockaders off their stations, an easterly wind sprang up and enabled Alliance to stand out to sea. She dropped the pilot an hour before noon and headed southwest along the Netherlands coast. Less than a day later, the frigate transited Dover Strait and entered the English Channel. On the night of 31 December, she was off Ushant, an island off the westernmost tip of Brittany, when 1779 gave way to 1780. For a bit over a fortnight thereafter, she cruised to the south looking for British shipping; but, with the exception of one small English brig that she took, the ship encountered only friendly or neutral vessels.
With her best American colors flying, the Alliance "…passed along the Flemish banks and getting to windward of the enemy's fleets of observation in the North Sea…" ran through the Straits of Dover in full view of the British fleet in the Downs. During the night of December 28 several vessels were seen and the next morning the frigate passed "..the Isle of Wight, in view of the enemy's fleet at Spithead, and in two days more got safe through the channel, having passed by windward in sight of several of the enemy's large two-decked cruising ships…" Jones then cruised a week or more to the southward and off Cape Finisterre. January 8, 1780, he captured a brig, which he sent to America. He went into Coruna January 16, where he was well received by the Spanish. Conyngham left the Alliance here and joined a ship bound to America. Jones sailed on January 28, in company with the French frigate Le Sensible. Want of winter clothing then prevented Jones from beginning an extended cruise in quest of prizes; and, instead, the ship struggled across the Bay of Biscay against head wind along a roughly northeasterly course toward L'Orient. In route, she recaptured a wine-laden French barque-a prized by an English privateer-and saved the foundering vessel's cargo before the barque sank. She also chanced upon Livingston and escorted that tobacco-laden American merchantman to the French coast.
Alliance anchored in Groix Roads on 10 February and moved into L'Orient harbor on the 19th. That day, Benjamin Franklin suggested that Jones take on a cargo of arms and uniform cloth for the American Army and promptly get underway for home. He also found the Serapis awaiting condemnation. She, the Countess of Scarborough and Pallas had gone from the Texel to Dunkirk, whence the Serapis had proceeded to L'Orient. She was eventually sold there, and the Countess of Scarborough at Dunkirk.

Captain Jones had to endure another long period of waiting on shore, being occupied for some time in giving the Alliance a thorough overhauling; for lack of money, this was less complete than he had hoped.
Jones description of the state of Alliance: “She had not one good sail; had left the Texel with only one anchor, and had I not procured two new cables from Amsterdam after I left the Serapis I should have lost the Alliance at the Texel. I never found a frigate in so bad a condition. Epidemical disorders raged among the crew; the officers always drinking grog, and there was a total want of subordination and negligence. The cutwater was loosened by laying in the trough of the swell in a gale of wind while separated from the squadron in the North Sea. I was obliged to secure it with an hawser. The bowsprit was too long, ran out too much in a horizontal line, and the ballast was a considerable part of it laid before the magazine in the fore peek and on the breast-hooks, the rest was ranged along the wings, cleated up at a very considerable distance from the keel and above the dead rising. The remainder of it was laid in the after peek and on the transom. The two fore guns had been carried run out over the bow, the after guns run out at the stern ports. The topmasts yards and rigging were large enough for a sixty-gun ship, and the tops were so ill-made and so narrow as to give the masts no proper support. It is impossible to imagine a worse arrangement than that of the store-rooms. They were divided and subdivided into little closets, nooks, and winding passages, and instead of being adapted to contain the ship's stores, appeared only fit to lodge dirt and increase the quantity of rats, already immense. The magazine was not only inconvenient, but very insecure from fire, etc. There was no fit orlop for the cables, and the sail-room could contain at most one of the spare courses. The deck was burnt through under the hearth, and the bottoms of the copper burnt out. Many obstructions of useless hatchways, etc., were in the way of the recoil of the guns, and the gangways were so ill-contrived as neither to afford a convenient passage from the quarter-deck to the forecastle, nor cover the men at the guns in the waist. The mizzenmast stood too close to the mainmast, the ship was very crank, plunged very deep in a head sea, and could neither sail nor work as a frigate. I began to put that ship in order immediately on my taking command, and after my arrival at L'Orient the essential repairs were finished early in April by the crew of the ship and four or five American carpenters hired from the Luzerne to assist ours. The materials of the old arrangement did not fall much short of finishing the new. Judges have allowed that when the business was finished everything about that frigate was perfect”.
He seems to have had an idea that the French government would bear the cost of repairs on the Alliance. Franklin wrote to him, February 19: "As to refitting your ship at the expense of this court, I must acquaint you that there is not the least probability of obtaining it, and therefore I cannot ask it. I hear too much already of the extraordinary expense you made in Holland to think of proposing an addition to it, especially as you seem to impute the damage she has sustained more to Capt. Landais's negligence than to accidents of the cruize. The whole expense will therefore fall upon me and I am ill provided to bear it, having so many unexpected calls upon me from all quarters. I therefore beg you would have mercy upon me, put me to as little charge as possible and take nothing that you can possibly do without. As to sheathing with copper, it is totally out of the question. I am not authorised to do it, if I had money; and I have not money for it, if I had orders. The purchase of the Serapis is in the same predicament . . . Let me repeat it, for God's sake be sparing, unless you mean to make me a bankrupt or have your drafts dishonored for want of money in my hands to pay them."
In spite of difficulties, however, the ship was in fine condition by the middle of April. Jones took on board twenty-eight eighteen-pounders and twelve nines, the guns that had been made for the BonHomme Richard, but were not ready in time; besides which it had been decided that eighteens were too heavy. Probably these guns were destined to America, and not mounted on the Alliance. Jones expected to return to America in the Alliance, but wished before he left France to settle his own and his men's affairs-his prizes not yet sold, his crew without wages, without prize money, and without clothes. In order to expedite matters, Jones made another trip to Paris and obtained the promise of an early sale. Franklin advanced a sum of money to supply the immediate needs of officers and men. The French government loaned the ship Ariel of twenty guns to accompany the Alliance to America and assist in transporting a large amount of clothing and military supplies for the Continental army. Many exchanged American prisoners arrived from England who would be available for her crew. Jones was received in Paris with marked distinction and was presented by the King with a gold-hilted sword and the cross of the Order of Military Merit; the latter in the following year, after having obtained the approval of Congress.

Jones agreed with Franklin's suggestion, this kept him in France for many months thereafter, attending to military, diplomatic, and social matters, which he felt to be important to his country, to his crew, and to himself. Most of this time, he was away from his ship in Paris.

During Jones's absence from L'Orient, Landais, instigated by Arthur Lee, encouraged a spirit of discontent almost amounting to mutiny among the crew of the Alliance. The men, led to believe that Jones was responsible for their not receiving the prize money due them, demanded the restoration of Landais to the command of the ship. Apparently, Jones here again, as on the Ranger, suffered from the lack of a warm personal regard for him on the part of his men, who, repelled by his demeanor, never understood his devotion to their interests. The former officers and men of the BonHomme Richard, however, stood by him. Lee expressed the opinion that as Landais's commission was not been revoked, nor had he been relieved by order of Congress, he was still legally in command of the Alliance. Jones wrote to Robert Morris: "I am convinced that Mr. Lee has acted in this matter merely because I would not become the enemy of the venerable, the wise and good Franklin, whose heart as well as head does and will always do honor to human nature." In regard to the legality of Landais's commission, the Board of Admiralty in a report to Congress a few months later observed that "Captain Landais regained command of the Alliance by the advice of Mr. Lee, notwithstanding his suspension by Dr. Franklin, who by the direction of the Marine Committee had the sole management of our marine affairs in Europe." John Adams, however, believed that the Marine Committee lacked authority to confer upon Franklin the power to remove the commander of a ship. Commodore Gillon of South Carolina, at that time in France, also took the part of Landais. The French ministry declined to take sides in the controversy. June 13, after Jones's return from Paris but during his temporary absence from the ship, Landais went on board and took command. Alliance weighed anchor and moved to Port Louis, where a recently emplaced boom blocked her path. The batteries that guarded the port, as well as three French warships, had received orders to fire on the frigate it she attempted to stand out to sea. To avoid trouble, which might be serious and lead to bloodshed, Jones relinquished his claim to the command.

About 1 July the Alliance sailed for America with Arthur Lee on board as passenger, but without the clothing so much needed by the army. The conduct of Captain Landais became so erratic during the voyage that the safety of the ship, crew, and passengers seemed imperiled. Landais quarreled with his officers, abused his men, and made life miserable for his passengers. The ship had hardly lost sight of land when he locked up Capt. Matthew Parke because the commanding officer of the embarked Marine Corps contingent refused to swear unconditional obedience under all possible circumstances. Any seamen who had joined the frigate after BonHomme Richard had sunk were suspected of disloyalty, many were shackled and imprisoned in the ship's rat-infested hold. Even Arthur Lee, who had urged the Frenchman to take command, came close to being stabbed with a carving knife for taking the first slice of roast pig at dinner. In operating and navigating the ship, Landais gave orders that violated the rules of safe and sensible seamanship.
The fearful and exasperated officers and passengers finally agreed that the commanding officer must be insane, and they forcibly relieved him of command, which devolved upon the first lieutenant. This was on August 10, in latitude 41° 30' north, longitude 59° west. Course was set for Boston, where she arrived, August 16. On September 5 Captain Barry was appointed to command the Alliance.
Barry arrived at Boston on 19 September with orders stripping Landais of all claim to command of the frigate. That unfortunate officer had shut himself up in the captain's cabin and refused to leave, and required force by a party of marines led by his first adversary of the voyage, Capt. Parke to remove him from the ship.
She remained in Boston Harbor during the rest of the year and on board of her was convened the court martial, of which Barry was president, for the trial of Captain Landais and his first lieutenant, James Degge, both of whom were dismissed from the navy.

Alliance fitted out at Boston for another voyage to France as soon as the court martial of Captain Landais was over. There was the usual delay and difficulty in recruiting a crew for the ship and an application was made to the state government for authority to impress seamen and to enlist soldiers. The former request was denied, but permission was obtained to enroll volunteers from the guard at the castle and it was again necessary to take a considerable number of British prisoners. A turbulent ship's company was the consequence and a sanguinary brawl on Long Wharf with the crews of two French frigates was an early result. Meanwhile, efforts to restore Alliance to fighting trim progressed slowly-when they moved at all-because of a dearth of both men and money. Funds for the necessary yard work and for provisioning and manning the ship were slow in reaching Boston until Col. John Laurens-a former aide-de-camp to General Washington, a successful battlefield commander, and an exchanged prisoner of war-appeared there on 25 January 1781. Congress had appointed Laurens as its envoy extraordinary to France because his military experience seemed to fit him to become a convincing spokesman for Washington's needy army. It had also selected Alliance as the speediest and safest ship to carry the dashing young officer to Europe. The urgency of Alliance's new mission made the funds and crew available so that the ship was ready to sail by the end of the first week of February. A favorable wind came up on the 11th enabling her to depart Nantasket Roads and stand out to sea.
Five days later, she entered crowded ice fields and suffered "considerable damage" as she forced her way through. Her crew contained many British sailors, a group of who plotted to take over the frigate and to kill all her officers but one who, spared would be required to navigate the vessel to an English port. Barry took careful precautions to prevent the mutiny from erupting, and had the would be mutineers arrested.
While she sailed eastward, Barry generally refused to pursue any shipping that would delay his progress, however, on 4 March; the frigate encountered a ship and a schooner. One shot brought both vessels to. The schooner proved to be the English privateer Alert and her consort was Buono Campagnia, a Venetian ship prized the Britisher had recently taken. Barry took Alert as a prize, but released the merchantman. Five days later, on 9 March, the frigate anchored in Groix Roads and disembarked her important passenger and his three companions: Thomas Paine, whose writings had exerted great influence in persuading the colonies to seek independence, Major William Jackson, a Continental Army officer from South Carolina, and the Viscount de Noailles , a cousin of Lafayette.

March 29, the Alliance got under way for her return voyage in company with a large French East Indiaman letter of marque called the Marquis de Lafayette, loaded with military stores for the Continental Army. Soon after sailing, another attempt at mutiny was discovered on the Alliance. John Kessler, mate of the frigate, who wrote a narrative of her voyages, says that "on March 30th an Indian, one of the forecastle men, gave Captain Barry information of a combination among the crew for the purpose of taking the ship, and pointing out three who had strove to prevail on him to be concerned therein. The three men were immediately put in irons and all the officers, with such of the crew as could be confided in, were armed and required to remain all night on deck. On the next morning all hands were called and placed on the forecastle, booms, and gangways, excepting the officers and such part of the crew in whom Captain Barry confided, who, armed, strongly guarded the quarter deck, the steerage, and the main deck, to keep the remainder of the crew together on the forecastle and boom. The three designated men were brought out of their irons on the quarter and, being stripped and hoisted by the thumbs to the mizzen stay, underwent a very severe whipping before either would make any confession. The names of 25 of their accomplices were obtained from them before the whipping was discontinued. As their accomplices were disclosed, they were called to the quarterdeck, stripped and tied to the ridge-rope of the netting and the whipping continued until it was thought all were disclosed that could possibly be obtained, which proved to be. That it was intended to take the ship on her passage out by killing all the officers in the middle watch of the night, except the second Lieutenant, P. Fletcher, who was to navigate her to some port in Ireland, or on failure, to be destroyed. A quartermaster, one of the mutineers, was to have command. They had all been bound by an oath on the Bible administered by the Captain's assistant cabin steward, and had also signed their names in a round robin so-called, but that they found no good opportunity on the outward passage and intended to accomplish the taking of the ship as aforesaid immediately on leaving France. But on coming out of L'Orient we lost a man overboard who was one of the chief ringleaders and they considering that as a bad omen, threw the round robin overboard and relinquished their designs. The three principles were placed securely in irons and the remainder, after being admonished by Captain Barry and on their solemn declaration to conduct themselves well, were permitted to return to ship's duty." The three principals, sentenced to death, escaped the ultimate punishment for their crimes, this penalty never being carried out in their case.

At dawn on 2 April, a lookout sighted two ships to the northwest; Barry headed toward the strangers and ordered the Indiaman to follow. Undaunted, the distant vessels-which proved to be two British brigs- continued to approach the little American convoy and fired a broadside at the frigate as they passed abreast. Two answering salvoes from Alliance robbed the larger English vessel of her rigging and forced her to strike her colors. She proved to be a brig with flush deck and 20 twelve pounders, two six pounders and 14 [four-pound coehorns], with 112 men, called the Mars and belonging to the Guernsey. The crew were taken aboard the Alliance and all put in irons without distinction, Captain Barry considering them as not meriting other treatment in consequence of their firing on us with no intention of bravely fighting.

Barry ordered Marquis De Lafayette to attend to the captured foe while he pursued and took the second brig. Marquis De Lafayette provided the prize crew for the smaller vessel, a Jersey privateer named Minerva of 10 guns and 55 men. Barry ordered the prize master of this vessel to head for Philadelphia but Marquis De Lafayette's captain had secretly ordered him to head for France if he had a chance to slip away. On the night of 17 April, foul weather separated Mars from the convoy. Nevertheless, that prize dutifully continued on toward the Delaware capes. Minerva slipped away during the next night and apparently set course for the Bay of Biscay. Marquis De Lafayette dropped out of sight during a fierce storm on the night of the 25th.
After spending two days looking for her lost charge, Alliance continued toward America alone. On 2 May, she took two sugar-laden ships out of Jamaica. Off Newfoundland Banks later that day, the frigate sighted, but escaped the attention of a large convoy from Jamaica and its Royal Navy escorts. Ironically, a few days before, the missing Marquis De Lafayette and her treacherous master had fallen prey to this same British force.
Almost continuous bad weather plagued Barry's little force in the days that followed until Alliance permanently lost sight of her two prizes on 12 May. During a tempest on the 17th, lightning shattered the frigate's main topmast and carried away her main yard while damaging her foremast and injuring almost a score of men.

An action was fought, May 29, with the British ship Atalanta and brig Trepassey in about north latitude 40° and west longitude 63°, which is described by Kessler. "Towards evening [of the 28th] discovered two sail on the weather bow standing for us and which after coming near enough to be kept in sight, hauled to wind and stood on our course. Towards day it became quite calm. After it became light it appeared that they were an armed ship and brig, about a league distant. At sunrise they hoisted the English colors and beat drum. At the same time the American colors were displayed by the Alliance. By little puffs of wind we were enabled to get within short hailing distance." At eleven o'clock the ships hailed each other. Barry learned that she the sloop of war Atalanta. Her smaller consort proved to be the brig Trepassey. The American captain then identified his own vessel and invited Atalanta's commanding officer surrender. A few moments later, Barry opened the inevitable battle with a broadside. The enemy ships immediately pulled out of field of fire of the frigate's broadsides and took positions where their guns could pound her with near impunity In the motionless air, Alliance-too large to be propelled sweeps-was powerless to maneuver.
Kessler continued, "The firing then began, but unfortunately there was not wind enough for our steerage way and they being lighter vessels, by using sweeps got and kept athwart our stern and on our quarters, so that we could not bring one-half our guns, nay, oft time only one gun out astern to bear on them, and thus laying like a log the greatest part of the time. About two o'clock Captain Barry received a wound by a grape shot in the shoulder. He remained, however, on the quarter deck until by the much loss of blood he was obliged to be helped to the cock-pit. Some time after, our colors were shot away and it so happened that at the same time such guns as would bear on them had been fired and were then loading, and which led the enemy to think we had struck the colors, and manned their shrouds and gave three cheers; by that time the colors were hoisted by a mizen brail and our firing again began. A quartermaster went to the wheel in place of one just killed there. At the moment a small breeze of wind happening, a broadside was brought to bear and fired on the ship and then one on the brig, when they struck their colors at three o'clock.".
Lieutenant Hoysted Hacker, assumed command of the ship when Barry was taken below for treatment, fought the ship valiantly, but despaired of victory with out being able to maneuver the ship to effectively bring her guns to bear. He approached the captain in his cabin where his wounds were being dressed and said, "I have to report the ship in frightful condition, Sir. The rigging is much cut, damage everywhere great, many men killed and wounded, and we labor under great disadvantage for want of wind. Have I permission to strike our colors?" Barry angrily replied, "No Sir, the thunder! If this ship cannot be fought without me, I will be brought on deck; to your duty, Sir."
Inspired by Barry's zeal, Hacker returned to the fray. A wind sprang up and restored the battered frigate's steerageway, enabling her to bring her battery back into action. Two devastating broadsides knocked Trepassey out of the fight. Another broadside forced Atalanta to strike, ending the bloody affair.

Captain Edwards of the Atalanta, testifying at his court martial, said of the Alliance that when "about two cables lengths to leeward she hoisted Rebel colours and fir'd a Shot across us. I immediately hoisted our colours, when she fired her broadside, wore, and as soon as on the other tack and her Guns woud bear, kept a constant Fire on us; our Firing began on her, but being at too great a distance, I ceast our Fire and endeavour'd to get nearer to her, which having effected she haild us, said she was the Alliance continental Frigate and desired we would strike." Edwards tried to keep up a conversation until the Trepassey could close, but the Alliance began the action again. The Trepassey was so anxious to get up that she passed under the stern of the Alliance "with too much way and in hauling under her Quarter, shot abreast of her; in this situation she received two broadsides." The Atalanta, brought under the frigate's stern and got between her and the Trepassey. The Atalanta continued the action an hour and a half longer, nearly three hours in all; she was then so greatly disabled in masts, yards, sails, and rigging as to be unmanageable. It was accordingly necessary to strike and the Trepassey, unable to get away, struck also. The Atalanta's mainmast soon went over the side. The master of the Trepassey, describing the battle, says that the Alliance, at a distance of half a mile to leeward, "hoisted rebel colours and gave the Atalanta and us a broadside, we being then very nigh to each other; we then 'bore up close alongside of her, the Atalanta on the starboard and the Trepassey on the larboard quarter, and began to engage. About an hour after the action began Capt. Smith of the Trepassey was killed."

The Atalanta, which carried sixteen guns and a hundred and twenty-five men, lost six killed and eighteen wounded; the Trepassey, with fourteen guns and eighty men, lost six killed, including the captain and eleven wounded. The Alliance’s loss was five killed, including the lieutenant of marines, and twenty-two wounded, three of them mortally. Captain Barry agreed with the British to send the Trepassey as a cartel to Halifax with all his other prisoners, about two hundred and fifty in number, to be exchanged for Americans; before entering upon this service the Trepassey's guns were thrown overboard. She arrived in due time at Halifax. The Atalanta, dismasted in the engagement, was fitted with jury masts, and put in charge of Hezekiah Welch, second lieutenant of the Alliance as prize master. Some weeks later, in the Vice-Admiralty Court at Halifax, Welch testified that he was ordered by Captain Barry "to take possession of the Atalanta and proceed with her to Boston, New England; that on their passage thither the 7th June last, being near Cape Cod, they fell in with His Majesty's ships of War the Assurance, Charlestown, Amphitrite and Vulture, which retook the said sloop Atalanta, put a British officer & Seamen on board her & sent her safe into this Port of Halifax”. After more patching her battered hull and rigging, Alliance set out the next day and reached Boston on 6 June.
While Barry recuperated, Lack of funds once again delayed Alliance’s repairs. Lord Cornwallis surrendered his army at Yorktown; ending the war's last major action on land, well before she was ready for sea. Again, the decision to use the frigate to carry an important person to France hastened her repairs. Lafayette-who had completed his work in America with a major role in the Yorktown campaign-arrived in Boston on 10 December 1781, wanting to return home.
Finally, frigate could muster a complete crew, through the efforts of the French minister a number of French sailors were obtained and some of the Continental frigate Deane's crew transferred to the Alliance to supplement those men already signed on. She sailed December 23, 1781, and in spite of her orders to avoid all vessels, she made a prize of a large ship from Jamaica that she sent into Boston. The ship arrived off L'Orient on 17 January 1782, disembarked Lafayette, and his party.

Barry wanted to make a cruise in European waters to capture British shipping who’s seamen could be used to free American prisoners by exchange. Alliance got underway in February and headed for the Bay of Biscay. Accompanying her out was the American letter-of- marque brig Antonio bound for home. Three days later, she chased and overhauled an American brigantine that jettisoned her guns in an effort escape. Antonio's commander offered to escort the unfortunate, and now defenseless, merchantman to Philadelphia and they parted from Barry the next day. Alliance encountered only friendly and neutral shipping before putting in at L'Orient on February.

Barry remained in port more than two weeks awaiting dispatches from Paris containing Franklin's observations on the diplomatic scene and on prospects for England's recognition American independence and negotiations for peace. The messages arrived on 15 March, and the following day Alliance head home.
Wretched weather and contrary winds plagued the ship for much of the voyage. The almost incessant northerly blasts forced her south into hot, unhealthful climes. Eight men died before the end of April when she managed to turn north with the trade winds and head for the Delaware River.

The frigate reached Cape Henlopen on 10 May, but found it guarded by a Royal Navy 64 gun ship of the line which-in company with a tender-gave chase. Fleeing south and eluding her pursuers, Alliance turned north around Montauk Point a across Long Island Sound to New London, Conn., where arrived she on 13 May. Frustrated by the inevitable shortages of men, money, and material, Berry’s attempt to return to sea as soon as possible after his arrival failed.
The Alliance sailed from New London, August 4, 1782, on a cruise. Soon after leaving port, she recaptured a prize brig. Barry sent home a narrative of this cruise, dated L'Orient, October 18, saying that he "proceeded as fast as possible off Bermudas; in my way I took a schooner from that place for Halifax. After cruizing off there for twelve or fifteen days, I retook a sloop from New London and sent her for Cape Francois. Finding the prizes I had taken of little value either to myself or country and in all likelihood should be obliged to return into port soon for want of men, was determined to alter my cruizing ground. I therefore thought it best to run off the banks of Newfoundland. In my way there I fell in with a whaling brigantine with a pass from admiral Digby; I mann'd her and sent her for Boston. A few days after, off the banks of Newfoundland, I took a brigantine from Jamaica bound to London, loaded with sugar and rum, and sent her for Boston; by this vessel I found the Jamaica fleet were to the eastward of us. I then carried a press of sail for four days; the fifth day I took two ships that had parted from the fleet. After manning them and having a fresh gale westwardly, I thought best to order them for France; a day or two after, I took a snow and a ship belonging to the same fleet. Being short of water and a number of prisoners on board, the westwardly winds still blowing fresh, and in expectation of falling in with some more of them, I thought it best to proceed to France, with a determined view to get those I had already taken in safe, and after landing the prisoners, to put out immediately; but meeting with blowing weather and a high sea, I lost the rails of the head and was in great danger of losing the head, which accident obliged me to put in here where I arrived yesterday with the above four prizes. After repairing the damages and getting what the ship may want, I shall put to sea on a cruize. I have likewise to inform you that the Ramilies, admiral Graves' ship, foundered, but all the crew were saved, several of which were on the prizes I took."

Several officers of the Alliance, being dissatisfied at not having received their pay, refused obedience to the captain and Barry ordered them under arrest. He was unable to obtain others to take their places, and was obliged to sail with inexperienced lieutenants promoted from the lower grades. The Alliance sailed from L'Orient, December 8, on a cruise. January 8, 1783, she arrived at Martinique, where Barry found orders to proceed to Havana. On the way there he was chased by a British fleet and again by a seventy-four and a frigate. At Havana, he found the twenty-gun ship Duc de Lauzun, purchased by Morris for the Continental navy. Barry's orders were to sail at once for the United States with this vessel in company and with a quantity of specie for the use of Congress. After a delay of about three weeks, partially do to Havana’s embargo closing that port. The Alliance and the Duc de Lauzun, Captain Green, sailed March 6, on the 10th, they saw three sail, which gave chase. The strangers turned out to be the British frigates Alarm and Sybil, and the sloop Tobago.
The headmost, the Alarm, got within gunshot of the Alliance and they exchanged fire, while the other two were fast coming up with the Duc de Lauzun. She was a dull sailor and Barry feared that if he stood by her, the result would be the capture of both American ships. He advised Green to heave his guns overboard and ran off before the wind, taking this advice; all but two or three of them thrown over. Another sail soon appeared-that of a French ship of fifty guns lately out of Havana. Barry was thereupon encouraged and looked for help from this ship. At this time, the Alliance had dropped astern, nearer the Duc de Lauzun, countering this maneuver, Alarm shortened sail and held off from them. The Sybil got within gunshot of the Duc de Lauzun and opened fire with her bow chasers, and receiving return fire from the Duc de Lauzun’s stern chasers. Confident in both Alliance's speed and her fighting ability, Barry maneuvered her between Sybil and Duc De Lauzun to demand the full attention of the former so that the latter might slip away to safety. Kessler, the mate of the Alliance, says: "Captain Barry went from gun to gun on the main deck, cautioning against too much haste and not to fire until the enemy was right abreast. He ordered the main topsail hove to the mast, that the enemy (who had already fired a Bow gun, the shot of which struck into the cabin of the Alliance) might come up as soon as he was abrest, when the action began and before an half hour her guns were silenced and nothing but Musketry was fired from her. She appeared very much injured in her hull. She was of 32 guns and appeared very full of men, and after an action of 45 minutes She sheered off." The Alliance lost ten wounded, one of them mortally; the Sybil, two killed and six wounded.
The log of the Sybil records that the American vessels were sighted at half-past five in the morning and the British then gave chase; at eleven, the Alliance showed Continental colors. At half-past eleven "the Comr (Commodore, evidently meaning the Alarm.) fired two or three broadsides at the large ship, who returned it; we were at this time about 3 miles astern of the Comre. The Tobago was abreast of us carrying a press of sail to get up." Twenty minutes later the Sybil got into action with the Alliance and received considerable injury to sails and rigging. At half-past twelve "a large ship bore down to the ship we Engaged, wch obliged us to sheer off." Kessler's story continues: "As soon as the ship which we had engaged hove from us, her consorts joined her and all made sail, after which the French ship came down to us and Captain Barry asked them why they did not come down during the action. They answered that they thought we might have been taken and the signal known and the action only a sham to decoy him.”

They then chased the British, but with the French 4th rate much slower then the frigates the pursuit had to be abandoned. The voyage was then continued. The Alliance and Due de Lauzun separated off Cape Hatteras. Finding two British cruisers off the Delaware capes, the Alliance bore away for Newport, arriving there March 20. The Due de Lauzun got into Philadelphia on the 21st. The battle between the Alliance and the Sybil was doubtless the last naval action of the Revolution, with the possible exception of some privateering exploit. Provisional articles of peace had been signed at Paris, November 30, 1782, and January 20, 1783.

Alliance continued on northward and arrived at Newport R.I., at mid afternoon on 20 March 1783. Since British men-of-war could easily raid that port, she soon proceeded up Narragansett Bay and anchored just below Providence. There, her crew reduced to peacetime needs, underwent a thorough overhaul.

Ordered to proceed to Chesapeake Bay to take on a cargo of tobacco for shipment to Europe, the frigate got underway on 20 June, but, headed for sea, she struck a rock and stranded until high tide. Upon floating free, Alliance still seemed to be tight and resumed her voyage via the Virginia capes and the lower Chesapeake Bay to the Rappahannock. She then moved up that river where she began taking on tobacco. When completely loaded, she headed downstream on 21 August and sailed into the Atlantic three days later.
Soon after the ship entered the open sea, water rose rapidly in her hold. A hasty investigation revealed that a leak had developed where she had struck the rock weeks before. The crew's attempts to steam the influx failed, forcing Barry to head for the Delaware.
Further examination of the ship at Philadelphia ruled out any quick remedy and caused Congress to cancel the voyage. Her tobacco transferred to other ships to transport, her crew further reduced to the bare minimum necessary to keep her in reasonably satisfactory condition, Congress debated her fate.

There was a strong sentiment in favor of keeping this ship permanently in the national service, and on January 15, 1784, a committee of Congress reported that the honor of the flag and the protection of the coast required her repair. Many felt, however, that all naval expenditure should cease. The question was deliberated from time to time until May 23, 1785, when considerations of economy prevailed and a committee of Congress recommended the sale of the frigate. Sold on 1 August 1785 to John Coburn and a partner named Whitehead, subsequently they sold her to Robert Morris who converted the vessel to an East Indiaman. Her new owner-who, as the guiding spirit on naval matters in the Continental Congress and that body's Agent of Marine in the later years of the American struggle for independence, had directed her operations-selected Thomas Read as her master during her first merchant service. That former captain in the Continental Navy took her to China by a new route through the Dutch East Indies and the Solomon Islands. She departed Philadelphia in June 1787 and arrived at Canton on 22 December of that year. While passing through the Caroline’s on the outward voyage Read found two islands which were not on his chart and named the first-probably Ponape-Morris, and the second, Alliance. At Canton, he loaded the ship with tea, which he delivered back at Philadelphia on 17 September 1788, ending a record voyage.
Apparently, no details of Alliance's subsequent career have survived. However, when she was no longer seaworthy, the former frigate was abandoned, beached on Petty Island across the Delaware from Philadelphia. At low tide, some of her timbers appeared in the sands there until dredging operations destroyed her remaining hulk in 1901.


A Naval History of the American Revolution
Gardner W. Allen Boston, Houghton, 1913
Howard Chapelle, The History of the American Sailing Navy: the Ships and their Development (New York: Norton, 1949)
Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships
Samuel Eliot Morison, John Paul Jones (1959)
The Revolutionary Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States, Volume 3
Franklin to the Navy Board. 15 March 1780, pages 547-549
The Revolutionary Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States, Volume 3
Franklin to Sartine. March 20, 1780, pages 562-563.
The Revolutionary Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States, Volume 4
Paul Jones to John Brown, Secretary Board of Admiralty. Pages 293-294
Letters of Delegates to Congress: Volume 22 November 1, 1784 - November 6, 1785 Charles Thomson to Pierre Landais page 428
Letters of Delegates to Congress: Volume 22 November 1, 1784 - November 6, 1785 Commissioners of the Treasury page 840
Journals of the Continental Congress, 1774-1789
Thursday, April 8, 1784. page 210
American State Papers, House of Representatives, 10th Congress, 1st Session
Claims: Volume 1 Pages 346, 347
American State Papers, House of Representatives, 11th Congress, 2nd Session
Claims: Volume 1 Pages 373, 374, 375